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Abstract 
This thesis examines how sovereignty is wielded on the Internet. The central argument is 
that US’ large-scale data gathering as conducted by the NSA is one practice to wield 
sovereignty on the Internet. However, data gathering is not self-sufficient but accompanies 
the current sovereign practices of nationalisation and protecting the US’ national sphere of 
the Internet, using data gathering as external measure as well as legislation and politics to 
sustain sovereignty and create new types of national borders. 
Currently, the US is employing intensive data gathering on the Internet, however, struggle 
with regulating internal data, despite having installed a kill switch on the Internet. The data 
gathering and surveillance legislation, FISA, delivers carte blanches of warrants to the 
Intelligence agencies enabling large-scale data gathering. Moreover, FISA protects US 
citizens from the most intensive data gathering practices, which are instead utilised on 
foreigners and data crossing US borders. The US is trying to carve a piece of sovereignty on 
the Internet by installing themselves as gatekeepers, monitoring all data traffic accessing the 
US territory, vindicated as protecting the US against the threat of terrorism. The US is 
bordering the national Internet by subjecting it to government regulation as a critical 
infrastructure. However, the US is also surrendering their global technical management 
position to a global multistakeholder body, ICANN, decreasing their sovereignty on the 
global Internet. Thus, the US’ sovereignty on the Internet involves the sovereign practices of 
extra-territorialisation, nationalisation and denationalisation. 
The thesis is an example of a study on the non-geographical system of the Internet from a 
territorial point of view, employing three theories of sovereignty by Stephen Krasner, Saskia 
Sassen and Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen. The thesis utilises a 
constructivist hypothesis-testing framework to examine how globalisation is influencing 
sovereignty. 
Keywords: Internet Governance, Data Mining, Sovereignty, FISA, Snowden, United States. 
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Introduction 
The Internet has in little more than two decades developed from being a technology only 
used by smaller communities of nerds and computer scientists to now having around 3 
billion users globally (Internet Live Stats 2015). The Internet has become an extension of 
people’s everyday life used for entertainment, reading news, dating, shopping and 
communicating with friends, family and work – both across the globe and the street. The 
Internet has already showed its usability for political organisation and social movements, 
facilitating much of the global Occupy Movement and the Arab Spring in 2011 (Saba 2011), 
essentially proving just how powerful a tool the Internet can be.  
While many use the Internet for everyday activities, businesses and institutions have 
increasingly pooled their infrastructure and sensitive data on the Internet including traffic 
systems, banking information, energy provision systems and military information. This has 
created concerns about the security of the Internet and the future of the Internet as 
structure. However, also optimism for a future with free and open information available to 
all enabled by the disseminations of the Internet to every corner of the world (Mueller 
2010:1-13). In here lies a debate, because how to balance a system which is both supposed to 
facilitate free and open communication but also protect the infrastructure and sensitive data 
pooled onto it? Moreover, cases of online identity theft or copyright infringement as well as 
publication of private or classified material from state, corporations or individuals puts 
further focus on the need to consider the Internet as more than a mere communications 
technology. Yet, the states’ attempt at increasing regulation and control of the Internet often 
encounters public protest (Bowman 2014; Merrett 2014). It seems that people want the 
positive benefits, the security of knowing that if they are victimised online they will be 
protected and there will be legal prosecution but are afraid of the negative consequences of 
such regulatory control. 
The critical voices against government control on the Internet have gained further 
momentum through the Snowden leaks in 2013-2014. Edward Snowden worked at the 
National Security Agency (NSA), an intelligence agency providing the state with encryption 
and decryption of code and Intelligence information (NSA 2015). He publicised vast amounts 
of classified documents revealing the intensity of US’ surveillance of the Internet as well as 
the amount of data stored by the NSA on citizens both from US and abroad (Reitman 2013). 
This created further critique and a heightened sense of fear amongst those believing the 
Internet to be key to increased openness and democracy. Much of this fear concerns mass-
surveillance, the freedom of the Internet, hacktivist attacks, cyberwar, cyber-espionage and 
cyber-threats in general. Considering these issues, it is easy to put on a tin foil hat claiming 
that it is all part of the states’ big brother control of our thoughts and actions. However, 
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whether we like it or not, it is also part of a new reality where unlimited information is 
available “out there” in data streams on the Internet. So what would happen if we cast aside 
the contestable layers of freedom and privacy and instead look more cynical at the 
developments within the political shaping of the Internet and the practices of data gathering 
as measures of power? This is what I will examine in this thesis. 
“…how conflicts over Internet governance are settled will determine some of the most 
important public interest issues of our time.” (DeNardis 2014:1) 
To examine this question it is also important to ask who wields power over the Internet? 
When considering the political shaping of the Internet, the so-called Internet Governance, a 
wide array of issues emerge, spanning from potential of cyberwar, copyright-infringement, 
cyber-crime, content-regulation, free information, human rights, censorship, industrial 
espionage, activism and questions of legal jurisdiction. These issues point towards different 
actors such as private corporations including IT/Tech-companies, telecommunicational 
corporations, hacktivist-groups such as Anonymous and UN assemblies. However, all of 
these issues at some level concerns or relies on the states as the only actor with executive, 
legislative and judicial power to decide on these matters. This also shows that while the 
Internet is borderless in the sense that data does not respond to physical borders or 
jurisdictions, sovereignty is still relevant. Sovereignty, in essence, means: 
“…both ultimate authority and external recognition. Internally, a state is sovereign when it 
exercises supreme authority over the affairs and people within its territory; 
externally, a state is sovereign when it is recognized as such by the international 
community....” (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:307). 
Many issues relating to sovereignty and the exercise of supreme authority on the Internet 
point towards the United States (US) specifically. American researches invented the 
ARPANET, which was the precursor to the Internet. Many of the world’s biggest Internet-
based corporations are based or founded in the US including Facebook, Google, Apple, 
Twitter and Microsoft, leaving much of the global data traffic to go through a server owned 
by a US corporation. The only administrative body of the Internet, the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is placed in the US. Lastly, the Snowden leaks 
that rendered visible the data gathering practices conducted on the Internet originated from 
US military Intelligence (Leiner et.al. 2012; Masters 2013; Reitman 2013; Roberts & Kiss 
2013). Therefore, we cannot overlook the US when considering the political shaping and 
landscape of the Internet. This position within the landscape of the Internet makes US one of 
the most likely cases where we could expect to find proof of sovereign measures over the 
Internet. However, how much impact does US’ sovereignty have? How does sovereignty 
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show itself? How influential is the US really on the shaping of the Internet? These are 
questions that I will examine. 
Aims and objectives 
My aim with this thesis is to examine how states are wielding sovereignty in the online space. 
I am working with the assumption that sovereignty is already showing itself on the Internet 
as large-scale data gathering. This is accepting the premises that the Internet is putting 
pressure onto the sovereign state because of its borderless architecture and resulting 
inconclusive jurisdictional borders, but pressure does not mean dissolving the sovereign 
state as institution. This approach contributes to the academic discussion on how 
sovereignty is doing facing structures of globalised nature. The focus of my thesis is this 
practice of transgressive gathering and storing of the data on the Internet users’ activities 
suddenly made available with the dissemination of the Internet. My hypothesis is that 
sovereignty in cyberspace displays itself as data gathering, and this is the hypothesis that I 
will substantiate and challenge throughout the thesis. My objective is to use my hypothesis to 
create a departure point for further research and understanding of the practices of 
sovereignty as unfold on the Internet as well as future development in Internet Governance 
to create grounds for e.g. comparative studies of Internet sovereignty.  
Hypothesis 
Data gathering is how sovereignty is wielded on the Internet 
Chapter Outline 
The thesis structure contains following chapters: 
 Chapter I: Theory & Methods 
First chapter contains a review of background theory, the theoretical framework, how the 
theory is used, the methodological grounding, reflections and methods used in the thesis 
and a limitations-section. This chapter constitutes the backbone and scientific 
foundation of the thesis. 
 Chapter II: Analysis & Discussion 
This is the analysis, the “body”, of the thesis, where I will use my theoretical 
operationalisation and empirical material to examine my hypothesis and gain insights 
into whether data gathering reveals itself as a sovereign practice. 
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 Chapter III: Discussion, Conclusion and final remarks 
The third chapter includes a discussion of the reliability of my hypothesis and the 
conclusion with a summary. I have further added a section on comments on findings 
where I will critically assert my conclusion’s validity and, lastly, I will point to what 
further research would be relevant relating to my thesis’ conclusions. 
 Literature & Appendix 
Last is my list of literature and appendix. First appendix contains a summary of the 
Snowden leaks and second a list of abbreviations used in the thesis. 
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Chapter I: Theory & Methods 
This first chapter contains all theory and methodology related to my thesis. The chapter 
starts with a review of the background literature of Internet Governance to gain an overview 
of current debates in the field. Afterwards, I present my theoretical framework divided into 
three theories, which I operationalise to present how I will methodological apply the 
theories. This is followed by “Methodology & Research Design”, where I go into the 
methodological and philosophy of science aspects of the thesis to reflect upon my scientific 
backing and methods and present my overall research design. I end the chapter with 
presenting my empirical materials and a limitations-section. I have chosen to begin with 
theory rather than methodology because my thesis is inspired by deduction, using theory to 
highlight empirical phenomena. 
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Background Literature Review: Internet Governance 
Since the popular dissemination of the Internet in the 90s an academic area viewing the 
Internet from a social science-perspective has arisen, the debate of so-called Internet 
Governance. This involves discussions on how the Internet is governed, through what means, 
at what ends, and by whom as well as normative debates on which principles should be 
guiding for the shaping of the Internet. However, it is still highly contested what “Internet 
Governance” actually entails. The most accepted definition is by the UN World Summit on 
the Information Society: 
 
“A working definition of Internet governance is the development and application by 
governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared 
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the 
evolution and use of the Internet.” (WSIS 2005:34) 
 
This definition is criticised for being too vague and therefor only useful to a limited degree, 
as well as limiting the influential actors to only constituting government, the private sector 
and civil society. Analyses that stem from this definition often suffers from two problems; 
some tend to over-institutionalize the field of Internet Governance, overstating the role of 
institutions such as ICANN in the broader “ecosystem” of Internet Governance. While others 
tend to treat the institutions of Internet Governance “…as completely separate from the 
galaxy of invisible work and mundane practices that happen on and by means of the 
Internet.” (Musiani 2015:274). 
Normatively, there are two originate fractions of thought on Internet Governance, cyber-
libertarianism and cyber-conservatism. The first fraction believing that the Internet is best 
served as completely free and independent from state or corporative influence, while the 
other camp argues that the Internet has always been bordered by the same sovereign states 
as the rest of the world (Mueller 2010:1-13). The first period of the Internet in early 90s was 
mainly governed through principles of cyber-libertarianism by a hacker culture characterised 
by openness and decentralisation. However, parts of the Internet became commercialised in 
mid to late 90s consequently changing the power structure of the Internet towards features 
of capitalisation. Many scholars question how significant the corporations are or should be in 
shaping the governing principles of the Internet (Sassen 2000). A notion is that the Internet, 
like any telecommunicational infrastructure in history, will become subject to 
commercialisation and turn into privately controlled behemoths in near future (Wu 2012: 3-
14). Other scholars emphasise that the states have or will take control of the Internet through 
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new strategies specific to the Internet (Mueller 2010) or old strategies of borders and 
jurisdictions (Goldsmith & Wu 2008). An old strategy might create borders in the code of the 
Internet, organising users by their individual citizenship in order to regulate the Internet 
according to the jurisdictions of the individual state (Lessig 2006:305-310). In this sense, 
states taking ownership of the Internet could result in overregulation because Internet pages 
must abide to very law of every state whose citizens have Internet access (Goldsmith & Wu 
2008:1-10).  
Yet, why must it be either states, corporations or civil society that governs the Internet? The 
idea that the Internet is and should be governed through so-called multistakeholderism is 
another perspective in the Internet Governance-debate. It is driven by the idea that “…the 
current transformations and their potential to limit sovereignty may not be the elimination 
of sovereignty but its unbundling and partial relocation to other supra-, sub and non-
national institutions.” (Sassen 2000:207).  The idea of multistakeholderism is often rejected 
by other scholars as being obscure and unrealistic (Lessig 2006: 305). In 
multistakeholderism it is argued that Internet Governance is shaped at assemblages located 
within the United Nations’ in the World Group for Internet Governance (WGIG), the United 
Nations’ World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) and the United Nations 
Information and Communication Technologies Task Force (UNICTTF). They see the current 
form of Internet Governance as ‘‘…the result of intense and prolonged interactions in such 
organizational arrangements operating in and around the United Nations…’’ (Musiani 
2015:276), arguing that the Internet is governed by multiple actors, not just states and 
corporations (Musiani 2015). 
Another perspective is that the one who has access to the kill switch decides on the 
governance of the Internet because the power to pull the switch is effectively the power to 
decide who can and cannot use the technology (Wu 2012:3-14). This is also approached from 
a more technical point of view where several “control points” of the Internet exist, which are 
anything “…from the blocking of financial flows to the deliberate ‘‘kill-switches’’ of Internet-
based services;” (Musiani 2015:281) - anywhere data is gathered, controlled, released, 
selected or shared is a control-point for Internet Governance (Musiani 2015). 
Another trend is to focus on state censorship as power:  “…the Internet has grown in 
political significance, an architecture of control – through technology, regulation, norms, 
and political calculus – has emerged to shape a new geopolitical information landscape.” 
(Deibert & Rohozinski 2010:3ff). States have constructed “…defensive perimeters to deny 
access to unwanted content.” (ibid.). The extreme example of this is the so-called Great 
Firewall of China, which began a paradigm of Internet Censorship where information is 
denied to the population, enhancing state control over national cyberspace. Hence, most 
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states are now seeking to “…normalize control and exercise of power in cyberspace through 
a variety of means.” (Deibert & Rohozinski 2010:6), legitimized by the fights against 
terrorism, child pornography and the agenda of cyber security. The most alarming 
vindication of censorship and online surveillance that has risen is the idea of prioritising 
security first driven both by fear of terrorism and fear of exploitation (Deibert & Rohozinski 
2010:3-13). 
Threats arising from the Internet are considered a security challenge both nationally and 
internationally (Mehmetcik 2014:126). Cyber threats have since 2013 been placed as the 
most important threat against US in the “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US 
Intelligence Community” (Clapper 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015). In 2011 NATO agreed 
upon answering any cyber-attack with the application of Article 5, i.e. that an armed cyber-
attack against one of the members of NATO should be considered and answered as an attack 
against all member-allies, making a cyber-attack comparable to a physical attack (NATO 
1949; NATO 2011). Many states have established military institutions to handle the security 
threat coming from the Internet (Mehmetcik 2014). In the literature, it has created 
discussion on whether cyberwar can be considered war, whether it corresponds to 
Clausewitzian concepts of war and whether cyber-deterrence can be established (Greathouse 
2014; Mehmetcik 2014; Shaheen 2014; Kassab 2014; Cavelty 2013). This constitutes the 
militarisation school within the field of Internet Governance, emphasising the Internet as a 
battle-domain and the states as sovereign actors needing to defend themselves against online 
threats. 
Scholars have been expecting the states to take control of the Internet for a long time, either 
politically or military if not both, while others emphasize that the telecommunicational 
corporations will take control. Most scholars argue that the Internet will radically change in 
governance structure within foreseeable time and seem to speculate on how such events will 
turn out. Instead of looking towards the future of Internet Governance, I will take my point 
of departure in the current developments of Internet Governance. I will analyse the states’ 
role as agents of Internet Governance assuming that they are trying to carve sovereign pieces 
for themselves on the Internet; however, I will not be assuming that states are the only 
powerful or influential actors on the Internet. In next section, I will go through my 
theoretical framework constituted by theories of State Sovereignty. I have found this an 
interesting perspective because sovereignty is underestimated within Internet Governance 
and, furthermore, because State Sovereignty is the most popular organisation of power in 
current world society and thus it seems likely that states will turn towards measures of 
Sovereignty to wield power and influence on Internet Governance. 
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Theoretical Framework 
Now, having reviewed tendencies of the literature of Internet Governance, I will here outline 
my theoretical point of departure. Instead of using theory designed around Internet 
Governance I have decided instead to use theory regarding State Sovereignty and 
particularly how data control is related to State Sovereignty, as I do believe that using theory 
from other fields of Internet Governance will create new insights into the nature of State 
Sovereignty in the context of the Internet. Thus, I am treating the Internet as a new 
phenomenon - a context, in where “old” phenomena will unfold, examining how they might 
unfold differently. 
How do we theoretically approach the concept of sovereignty as related to data gathering 
without engaging too much with the meta-theoretical nuances and debates of sovereignty? I 
employ three different theories regarding sovereignty that I see to complement each other, 
although these three theories are different both in scope, as well as methodological and 
philosophy of science-terms. I will return to how I combine the different approaches in my 
methodological-section. The three theories are: Stephen Krasner’s Sovereignty: Organized 
Hypocrisy (1999), Saskia Sassen’s  Territory, authority, rights (2008), and lastly Rebecca 
Adler-Nissen & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen’s Sovereignty Games (2008). I will unfold the 
theories in the following sections. It is a strategic choice for me not to rely on one specific 
theory of sovereignty but instead engage with the sovereignty debate as I see the sovereignty-
concept to be disputed in a way that would inhibit rather than accommodate a constructive 
research of sovereignty on the Internet. 
Krasner: Sovereignty as control of flows 
I employ Stephen Krasner’s types of sovereignty as a theoretical focal point to describe the 
different ways of conceptualising sovereignty as practice and norm, focusing on 
interdependence sovereignty. Krasner divides sovereignty into four categories: international 
legal sovereignty as the practices of mutual recognition creating jurisdictions; Westphalian 
sovereignty as the political organization which excludes external actors from authority within 
a given territory; and domestic sovereignty as the formal organisation of political authority 
in institutions within a territory; and, as I focus on, interdependence sovereignty which I will 
describe below. An important point on these types of sovereignty is that “[a] state can have 
one but not the other.” (Krasner 1999:4). Krasner argues that it is historically rare that states 
have all four aspects of sovereignty and rare that they obtain interdependence sovereignty. 
Moreover, he argues that other agents of sovereignty than the state have existed of different 
success (Krasner 1999). 
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The idea of interdependence sovereignty entails that sovereignty is created and practiced by 
“…the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, 
pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state.” (Krasner 1999:3). The types of 
sovereignty differs on whether sovereignty is based on authority and legitimacy or control. 
Control in this sense, “…can be achieved simply through the use of brute force with no 
mutual recognition of authority at all.” (Krasner 1999:10). However, what truly constitutes 
the boundary between control and authority is blurry. Losing control over a period can result 
in loss of authority and the effective exercise of control can create new systems of authority. 
Yet, if the accepted rules of control fails to work for a sovereign, its authority could also be 
rejected. Thus, a loss of interdependence sovereignty “…would almost certainly imply a loss 
of domestic sovereignty in the sense of domestic control but would not necessarily imply 
that the state had lost domestic authority.” (Krasner 1999:10). Therefore, even though the 
types of sovereignty do not necessarily covary, they are interlinked and affect or contradict 
one another. 
Krasner sees interdependence sovereignty as highly relevant to current discussions on 
whether globalisation erodes State Sovereignty. However, he notes that “; increasing 
transnational flows have not necessarily undermined state control.” (Krasner 1999:13). Yet 
he still opens for the technological developments’ different impacts on State Sovereignty. A 
loss of interdependence sovereignty as control might result in increased work on enhancing 
other types of sovereignty more impacted by authority. Thus, we can see that it is not just 
whether a state has interdependence sovereignty that matters, but also how they use it or 
what they do to counterbalance potential loss of interdependence sovereignty (Krasner 
1999:13). 
Krasner remains highly sceptical of the “globalisation narrative” of states being under 
historically unique pressure from outside. Instead he argues that challenges against the 
state’s control are not new, that migration numbers have been higher and ideas such as 
religious communities have been more penetrative across states, therefore “; regulation and 
monitoring of transborder flows have always been problematic.” (Krasner 1999:223). Thus, 
he also emphasises the importance of history in scientific studies (Krasner 1999). 
Sassen: What constitutes sovereignty? 
Krasner points to what he calls “bundles of principles” such as territory, extraterritorial 
authority, control, international recognition and supranational authority, which define 
conventional sovereignty (Krasner 1999:229. That sovereignty is not just different kinds of 
authority and control leads to my usage of Saskia Sassen’s theory which further ties my 
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theoretical framework onto the globalisation-debate as well as deconstructs what 
“principles” lies within the sovereign constellation. 
Sassen describes how constituent parts of traditional sovereignty – defined as the 
assemblage of the three concepts Territory, Authority and Rights (TAR), is disassembling 
and re-assembling inside and outside the state in a process of denationalization. The 
sovereign state is constantly changing and has become unstable, but it is not dissolving even 
though bits of TAR has assembled at different levels (Sassen 2008:400-423). Sassen’s notion 
is that sovereignty consists of different assemblages of TAR. Historically, the sovereign 
nation-state constitutes a period-specific assembly of Territory, Authority and Rights: The 
Westphalian system, which brings perhaps the most basic and useful understanding of what 
constitutes the elements of TAR and how the elements are linked: 
“Where in the past most territories were subject to multiple systems of rule, the national 
sovereign gains exclusive authority over a given territory and at the same time this 
territory is constructed as coterminous with that authority, in principle ensuring a similar 
dynamic in other nation-states. This in turn gives the sovereign the possibility of 
functioning as the exclusive grantor of rights.” (Sassen 2008:6). 
What constitutes the elements of TAR is who (authority) rules what (territory) how (rights). 
However, Sassen’s concepts are more nuanced. Territory is not just land, which was the 
specific institutionalisation of TAR during a historical phase dominated by the nation-states. 
Instead, territory is the geography of the authority’s rule, perhaps best found through asking 
where the limits of the ruler is: it is space in a more abstract form and thus also 
transformations of territoriality including cyberspace. Rights is also perhaps best found 
through its limitations, what the ruler cannot do to its subjects, what are their rights, and 
what is the rights of the ruler. Authority is who or what decides or rules. The idea that 
someone/something should have authority to bind together territory and rights. Together, 
“…the particular structurations of TAR […] constitute forms of power.” (Sassen 2008:410). 
She uses two main categories to explain the process of historical change: capability, which is 
the particular assembly of TAR and organizing logic, which is the “…dynamic and the 
relational system that constitutes an order, in our case a social and geopolitical order. “ 
(Sassen 2008:404). Her point is that whatever historical order we are having, it contains its 
own organisational logic with a specific combination of TAR – a capability, and that each 
historical order has a tipping point where TAR will unravel and reassembly into a new 
organisational logic (ibid.). 
Even though bits of TAR has assembled outside the state it does not necessarily create great 
challenges against the sovereign state; or at least no greater than what we have seen in 
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history. In this sense, we can recognise that the Internet is an assembly stretching beyond 
the sovereign state itself, and that pieces of sovereignty is assembled there, without it 
necessarily causing the sovereign state to dissolve. There is no mutual exclusivity of the 
global and the national (Sassen 2008:400-406). 
Sassen claims that TAR is re-organizing in denationalized assemblages which are located at 
the sub-national, national or global level. This creates a process where bits of TAR is 
escaping the state while state sovereigns re-instate territorial borders on areas otherwise 
defined by being non-bordered (Sassen 2008:415-419). Thus, what truly defines the current 
era is the idea that TAR is exclusively bundled with the nation-state is replaced by parallel 
denationalization – where TAR is escaping the national grip, and reterritorialization – where 
states recapture territory and reinstate borders. 
Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen: How is sovereignty done as acts of 
power? 
I find Sassen’s approach to TAR and her reterritorialization concept interesting, especially 
seeing the Internet as becoming re-bordered. However, in terms of how reterritorialization 
as well as sovereignty is done in practice, Sassen leaves it unexplained. Therefore, I will 
complement her and Krasner’s theory with the work of Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen who works on how sovereignty is claimed. This theory will complete my 
theoretical framework. 
Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen sees sovereignty through the prism of sovereignty 
games. Their claim is that sovereign actors, primarily but not exclusively states, make moves 
in order to sustain and attain sovereignty: “Rather than looking to measure sovereignty as 
something “out there”, the emphasis is rather placed on how it is used, or being played out, 
as legal and political practices.” (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:7). Thus, 
sovereignty is analysable as a claim to sovereignty. They introduce two main moves that are 
evident in European politics: horizontal sovereignty games and vertical sovereignty games. 
Both involve ”…various actors aim[ing] at simultaneoulsy enhancing authonomy and 
legitimacy by playing stregically on the discursive and legal structure of sovereignty.” 
(Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:11). Sovereignty is a game where different actors 
try to enhance their sovereignty by strategical claims for sovereignty (Adler-Nissen & 
Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:1-17). 
In vertical sovereignty games, authority or decision-making power is passed up and down in 
political and legal levels to e.g. regional, international or domestic fora, in order to enhance 
political autonomy in those arenas (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:11-14). 
Horizontal sovereignty games, on the other hand, is “…the conceptual stretching of 
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sovereignty to cover activities outside the area traditionally reserved for exercises of 
ultimate authority – the national territory” (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:12). 
Often facilitated by international institutions or private corporations this move makes areas 
otherwise considered outside sovereign control a crucial part of the sovereign claim. These 
horizontal claims to sovereignty are transforming the notion of geography through 
disconnecting state power from the sovereign territory. These moves have often proved an 
attempt at escaping conventions or sovereign responsibilities through arguing that the 
geographical placement of e.g the Guantanamo base lies outside the sovereign territory of 
(here: ) the US, while on the other hand claiming that the area has great importance for 
sovereign interests. Horizontal moves includes broadening the scope of interests and 
pushing boundaries through e.g. employment of armed troops abroad as means of self-
defense: this is a move of “extra-territorialization” (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2008:11-17) – or in, Saskia Sassen’s term, reterritorialization. Lastly, horizontal moves have 
created new actors and new locations, while it has extended its scope to include e.g. the 
Internet and outer space (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:208). 
Adler-Nissen & Gammetoft-Hansen’s central point is that sovereignty and the way 
sovereignty is wielded changes and new measures and strategies are used to sustain 
sovereignty. Sovereignty continues to be a desired “property” even though many claim that it 
is increasingly put under pressure. A premise for sovereignty is that it reveals itself when put 
under pressure: “it is in a time of crisis that what is ordinarily taken for granted needs to be 
most vigorously defended” (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:8). This view relates 
to Giorgio Agamben as well as Carl Schmitt’s ideas of a state of exception, both arguing that 
the sovereign reveals itself at a time of exception or emergency because it is the only actor 
who can decide on what constitutes the exception (Agamben 1998:13ff, 17-19) 
Yet, the changes in sovereignty games have transformative potential for the concept of 
sovereignty itself and we should therefore be careful with approaching the concept of 
sovereignty too narrow-minded and methodologically rigid. “Sovereignty is constitutive of 
both international relations and international law, but when sovereignty games are played 
out and new practices are invented, the tensions between these realms and the deeper 
meanings of sovereignty come to the fore and affect our world imaginaries.” (Adler-Nissen 
& Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:209). 
Operationalisations - What to take to the analysis 
In this section I will present my operationalisation consisting of the main theoretical points 
that I will apply in my analysis. It is organised in the same structure as the analysis’ part I, II 
and III and predominately organised by theoretical scholars. However, as Sassen’s concept of 
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reterritorialization and Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen’s concept of extra-
territorialization are very similar, they are organised under the same section. In the 
operationalisation, I also reflect on how I methodologically will see and “measure” the 
theoretical arguments and in which type of empirical material I might find answers. 
From Krasner 
Krasner argues that a nuance of sovereignty is the ability to control flows. We should see the 
Internet as constituting flows of information and ideas that cross the borders of the state and 
needs to be controlled to sustain sovereignty. Control should be understood as the ability to 
regulate which flows of information and ideas that are available to the population as well as 
store or gather this information on a large-scale basis. Storing large amounts of data creates 
a level of control of the data and of the persons whom the data concerns. In this sense, 
gathering data is somewhere on a spectrum of control-practices in the light, more passive, 
end because it reveals a level of access and ability but not actively engaging behaviour. This 
operationalisation of control of flows does not exclude other communication media such as 
printed books to be subject to the same controlling measures. Yet, how do we measure 
control? Control is not straight-forward and to completely confirm or deny whether it is 
happening might not be possible, but I argue that in any time where we can see an agent of 
power actively engaging in a degree of regulation of a flow, such as needing to authorise, 
censoring, organising, or storing, it is a degree of control. Thus, control is a qualitative 
phenomenon. Moreover, as a reaction to the pressure of flows coming from technological 
developments, we should expect to see one or more states’ solo run for control of data flows 
and a lack of binding agreements between sovereign actors on the area. 
Interdependence sovereignty is based on control, which can be achieved through brute force 
and needs no mutual recognition of authority or legal agreements. Therefore, we must ask 
whether the Internet is attempted controlled through brute force. As physical brute force is 
invalid on the Internet, brute force must be measured as the control-mechanisms that does 
not involve compromise or negotiation with other actors. Brute force is regulatory measures 
forced upon the subjects with or without their knowledge. These mechanisms should be 
visible through looking at data’s control-points. Especially exploring whether there is an 
evident “kill switch” of the Internet and where it is located would be a viable way of 
confirming whether brute force is utilised. Methodologically, brute force is, as well as 
control, a qualitative phenomenon. Generally, the concepts from Krasner’ theory points 
towards cases, legislation and policies as empirical material. This is where we would expect 
to see the amount and degree of control and other regulatory measures taken towards the 
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Internet as either measurable in numbers or quality, or described in official policies and 
legislation. 
From Sassen 
Sassen’s argument is that sovereignty can be dissolved into three components: Territory, 
Authority and Rights. By analysing a specific order of TAR – a capability, we can bring focus 
to a constellation of sovereign power. This concept is useful because it changes our focus 
from the whole of “the sovereign state” into concepts which are empirical feasible. Given my 
hypothesis, if data gathering should constitute a type of sovereignty of the Internet it must 
include a specific assembly of TAR with its own organisational logic. While Sassen is never 
specific on what the individual elements of TAR is and how they should be measured, I use 
the following indicators. 
Territory is the scope of a certain order – or capability. This scope can be measured as a 
geography but also just the space in which the order reigns. It would best be found by asking 
“where is the order not reigning – where are the limits?”, but also ideas of jurisdictions are 
great indicators on the scope of a Territory. On the Internet the idea of Territory seems a 
blur, however, the information has a geography – either a place of origin or a geography 
where a server is positioned. Moreover, analysing legal text on where data is legally “mined” 
or extracted could also indicate the Territory. 
Authority is who or what that rules in the specific capability. The authority could be revealed 
by finding indicators on which actor that legitimates or decides both the T and the R in the 
capability - it would therefore make sense to examine the Authority after the T and R. In a 
feudal-societal-context Authority would often be the king as claimed in the constitution, 
while the religious head’s might be the authority in other contexts. I see legal text to be a 
great indicator of Authority. 
Rights is the norms of both the ruler and the ruled in a capability. Found by asking: What is 
the authority allowed to do to its subjects, what is it not allowed to do, and what is the 
boundaries of the actions of the Authority? Again, legal text and constitutions are great 
indicators for this. 
Organizational logic is the logic that brings together the three elements of TAR and justifies 
the order of their reign. I see the idea of organizational logic to deconstruct how a certain 
order legitimises itself and at what premises. When the elements of TAR has been identified, 
this will be the logic that brings them together and legitimises its actions. In practice, TAR is 
a qualitative phenomenon accessible through careful analysis of texts or documents 
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concerning the ruling of a sovereign such as law. It is a constructivist phenomenon as the 
focus is on the constitutive elements, TAR, of the construction “sovereignty”. 
From Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 
Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen says that sovereignty is most evident when put under 
pressure: “it is in a time of crisis that what is ordinarily taken for granted needs to be most 
vigorously defended” (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:8). Therefore, the 
sovereign would most evidently reveal itself when put under pressure and/or challenges 
from within or outside. Thus, any period of internal or external crisis would present the best 
context for studying how sovereignty is unfold and in what way the actions of the sovereign is 
being defended. This point to an empirical context as being relevant for an analysis of 
sovereignty unfolded. I therefore see controversial cases such as the reaction to the Snowden 
leaks as a feasible way of investigating whether data gathering as conducted by US is 
defended as a measure of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty should be seen as a claim for sovereignty. Claims for sovereignty can be 
happening either vertically or horizontally. Horizontal claims for sovereignty is when a 
sovereign actor (e.g. a state) claims sovereignty on otherwise non-sovereign areas. I see 
sovereignty claims as measurable through speech-acts. This would involve looking at the 
statements concerning the Internet by the sovereign actor as well as cases of political 
incentives where power or management changes hands, which would reflect previous speech 
acts of change. This would give us insights into whether and how strong the sovereignty 
claims are, and this type of sovereignty is therefore a qualitative phenomenon. 
Horizontal claims for sovereignty is changing the way we perceive territory and can extra-
territorialize a territory by claiming that what goes on is a matter for the sovereign. This 
notion of extra-territorialization (Ader-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen) I perceive as being 
the same phenomena as that approached by Sassen as “reterritorialize”. Sassen’s point is that 
the current order is impacted by both denationalization and reterritorialization by sovereigns 
- that while some decision-making power is diverted outside the state, it is at the same time 
reterritorializing arenas which have previously not been subject to the state. Since extra-
territorialization is a specific form of sovereign claims it would be empirically feasible 
through same measurements. Speech-acts particularly naming the Internet an issue for the 
state and/or a threat against the state and hence the object of state interaction would 
confirm extra-territorialization. Moreover, the shifting of political power through incentives 
of reorganising the management of the Internet would be another way to confirm or deny the 
act of extra-territorialization.  
22 
 
Methodology & Research Design 
Moving away from the theoretical framework and operationalisations for my thesis, I will 
now reflect upon my methodological foundation, empirical considerations as well as sketch 
my research design in the following section. 
Fundamental approach 
In have chosen to work with a hypothesis rather than a research question. This point of 
departure gives a sense of direction in a thesis, which might otherwise risk muddling through 
the controversial and disputed scientific area of Internet Governance: “…a hypothesis is 
derived from the research literature currently available in a particular area […]; 
sometimes referred to as ‘soaking and poking’.” (Franklin 2012:65). “Soaking and poking” 
means that in inserting (“soaking”) yourself into the academic field you formulate a 
hypothesis that meddles with (“pokes”) the existing literature of the field. A hypothesis 
asserts that two phenomena are interlinked in a certain way, giving room to substantiate 
and/or challenge this statement (Franklin 2012:63-66). In my opinion, a hypothesis should 
therefore be bold in order to ensure that this linkage between concepts is interesting and 
challenging to the field itself. 
While my aim is to examine the link between data gathering and sovereignty broadly, I have 
chosen the US as empirical focal point. This choice is based upon the fact that the most 
common assemblages of the Internet are based or founded in the US including corporations 
such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo, AOL, LinkedIn and the 
governing body ICANN (Roberts & Kiss 2013; Masters 2014). Moreover, the leaks of 
classified NSA documents by Edward Snowden in 2013 and onwards opened up a hornet’s 
nest concerning the NSA’s data handling permissions. The leaks pinpointed US as a hotspot 
concerning large-scale compilation of Internet data while bringing empirical material of use 
for my analysis. This view, however, does not comprise that the US is the only actor with 
sovereignty online. On the contrary, my empirical choice of the US as focus is founded in the 
idea of hierarchy in anarchy and sovereign inequality, as expressed by Donnelly (2006). 
Donnelly argues that sovereignty is often unequal. States have different levels of sovereignty, 
and they are placed in a hierarchy accordingly. This hierarchy of sovereign inequality is part 
of the anarchy of the world order. Sovereign states are in a hierarchy where some states, 
particularly the Great Powers, are placed higher in the hierarchy resulting in their decision-
power having influence over the decisions of other sovereigns. The US is such a case of a 
Great Power (Donnelly 2006). Therefore, I can both argue that the US is a dominant 
sovereign on the Internet while not eliminating the existence of other sovereignties. As the 
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US is the primary geographical centre for the Internet as well as highest in the hierarchy of 
sovereigns their politics on data gathering have consequences outreaching their own borders. 
Therefore is a focus on the US not a domestic focus but an international. 
Combining three theories and their view on power 
The theories I have chosen represent an array of overlapping and yet supplementing 
approaches to the concept of sovereignty. Krasner represents a more traditionalist point of 
view where sovereignty remains something “out there”. Sassen is constructivist in her 
approach seeing sovereignty as something constructed by the three elements, TAR. At last, 
Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen are more inspired by a linguistic turn within 
constructivism where sovereignty remains a claim – an act, constructed by what is said and 
done. Thus, sovereignty is both an actor, an act, and a claim. This ambiguousness is evident 
in the different ways that Krasner and Sassen uses the term “authority”. Krasner uses it as a 
type of act alternative to utilising control whereas Sassen uses authority as the actor who is 
the authority. 
However, what the three conceptualisations have in common is that they consider power 
wielding as implied in sovereignty as relativist, “…where sovereignty is cut up and 
measured along its proclaimed constituent parts.” (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2008:207). A relativist power approach holds that what constitutes power is that it is located 
within a human relationship and thus not just a sheer production of effects or result of 
resources, “…power exists in and through a relation, it is not the possession of any agent.” 
(Guzzini 2010:16). Context creates sovereign power. Sovereignty is not an objective matter 
but is sustained as relational to other agents, not as a natural phenomenon; it is an 
institution produced and re-produced through societies actions and thus cannot be 
separated from its history, which is why all three scholars build much of their theory on 
history. This view shifts the focus for explaining power from the recipient of a power 
sanction whose behaviour must be altered to confirm power wielding, to focus on the power 
wielder instead. Power is neither defined as resource nor event, “…but as the capacity to 
effect an action.” (Guzzini 2010:17), stressing the effecting of outputs, not the complete list 
of outcomes. The focus is on “…the causal link between power base and outcome.” (Guzzini 
2010:17). In my thesis, this power base is data gathering and the expected outcome is 
Internet sovereignty, but this might not be the only power base which creates Internet 
sovereignty. What can constitute a power base is extremely broad within the relativist school 
– anything, from social norms, history, norms, motivation, practices, to military capabilities, 
and to methodologically delimit this list and define the power base(s) is a task specific to 
each analysis (Guzzini 2010:13-19). 
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Furthermore, what the theories have in common is that they do not recognise “the end of 
sovereignty”-thesis, but are all persisting that sovereignty might change, but will not vanish. 
In methodologically terms, this means that what constitutes the power base of sovereignty 
will change and sovereignty might be altered, but the concept of sovereignty will prevail. 
Constructivist approach 
I profess to a constructivist approach holding that sovereignty is a period-specific 
institutional construction. The advantage of using constructivism is that the three theories 
can be combined because although Krasner is a traditionalist, constructivism has no problem 
accepting the premises of his theory. Constructivist supplement that sovereignty instead of 
being “out there” is perceived of being out there and thus claims a vindication of itself as 
close to natural laws, underlining just how powerful an institution sovereignty truly is. 
Constructivism (or social constructivism) holds that structures of reality are socially 
constructed and reality is only accessible through understanding how it is socially 
constructed – there is no “real world” to access beyond. Moreover, context matters, as there 
is no objective “reality” out there each context is unique because the world does not act upon 
any natural laws. This relies on a social ontology where social actions and beings cannot be 
treated separate from their context. There are no “absolute interests” in international 
relations, what matters is what the actors perceive to matter. In this sense, the code 
constituting data can be just as important as e.g. oil or water if actors perceive them to be so. 
In terms of epistemology, constructivist are embracing both hypothesis-testing and 
explanation of underlying structures as means of gaining access to the social fabric of reality 
(Fierke 2010). 
Visual research design 
Having discussed the methodological backbone of my thesis I will now present my research 
design. It is organised according to the three theories that form the basis of my three 
subanalysises and what sub-questions they seek to answer. I find that methodology designs 
are often easier to understand if they are visual and have therefore chosen to present the 
structure of my analysis this way. The visualisation shows the individual sections of my 
analysis and what theory and empirical material I will use in each section. What is not 
evident is how I get from my hypothesis to using the US as analytical focus in my analysis, 
which I have accounted for in my Fundamental approach-section in same chapter. 
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How I use my empirical materials 
After having reviewed my methodology, I will now turn towards the empirical material I use 
in my analysis. As seen in the operationalisation, all of my theory points towards a 
qualitative method using either documents, legal text or speech-acts as empirical material. 
While I take my point of departure in theories, it might be natural to argue that I am 
deploying a strict hypothesis-deductive-method. Although the structure of my thesis is 
deductive in that I begin at theory and deploy empirical material throughout the analysis, the 
way towards formulating the hypothesis required much understanding of the field. I argue 
that I utilise a more loose form of hypothesis-deductive method, much inspired by the 
method of “soaking and poking”. Here I will outline the empirical material I apply in my 
analysis and which methodological reservations I have towards the material. 
Journalistic material 
I use an array of articles to highlight cases, specifically the so-called “net neutrality”-case and 
the case of ICANN in subanalysis III, as well as different sorts of arguments and critiques 
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towards legislations and politics. Generally, using journalistic material should be followed 
with reservations. The focus for journalists span from communicating politics but also selling 
newspapers, which makes journalistic material less reliable than e.g. academic research. 
However, journalistic material is reliable as observations of events, personal views and 
critical standpoints. I will use a number of articles from online newspapers and magazines to 
explore political cases and critique. The articles are from a range of sources spanning from 
tech-magazines, political and cultural magazines, newspapers, non-profit organisations, 
think tanks and trade associations. I have deemed all articles reliable in their context by e.g. 
looking at how their content is similar to other articles. Moreover, I use a summary of the so-
called “Snowden leaks”, which usage I will go through next. 
Overview of Snowden leaks as provided by Al Jazeera (see Appendix I) 
I will use a summary of Snowden’s leaks from June 5th 2013 to September 15th 2014 from the 
news-site Al-Jazeera to trace tendencies of US intelligence’s data gathering practices. The 
text is a timeline summarising the journalistic stories based upon the leaks in the period. I 
chose this as empirical foundation because the complete list of material and documents 
related to the case is enormous and much of it not publically accessible. Because the leaks are 
constituted by unconfirmed classified documents, it is not possible to verify their credibility. 
However, the scandals that the leaks created, its high level of credibility amongst journalists 
and the President’s failure to deny the truth of the content (Obama 2013), adds credibility to 
the leaks. Moreover, the journalists, initially only Glenn Greenwald and documentarist Laura 
Poitras, who Snowden gave access to the classified documents, have high credibility and have 
done their own evaluation of the credibility and legitimacy of the leaks (Reitman 2013). The 
credibility of the content is unconfirmed, but highly plausible. However, because of the 
unconfirmed nature of the documents, I cannot use them as primary base for my argument 
in a case-by-case analysis. Instead, I have chosen to use the timeline-summary to trace the 
US’ main tendencies of data gathering. While some may criticise that I am using not 
completely verifiable material, I see the contents to be too interesting to ignore as well as of 
high credibility. I will argue that in tracing tendencies instead of individual cases I am 
securing myself against over-emphasising a specific case, risking the credibility of the 
individual document. I will refer to the specific cases by date as they are organised 
chronologically in Appendix I. 
Academic research 
Academically research is amongst the most reliable empirical material due to the strict 
nature of scientific method. I will use material from the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), to analyse 
the US’ data gathering-practices. 
27 
 
Open Net Initiative (ONI) – Country Profiles on Filtering practices: United States 
The ONI is a collaboration between three acknowledged institutions: Citizen Lab at Munk 
School of Global Affairs in University of Toronto, the Berkham Center for Internet and 
Society in Harvard University and the SecDev Group in Ottawa. Besides featuring some of 
the main scholars on Internet Governance, ONI works with researching global Internet 
filtering and surveillance practices. They release country profiles, which analyses the current 
Internet filtering and surveillance practices of most countries globally. I supplement the 
country profile of US with an ONI-analysis of Internet surveillance strategies by Hal Roberts 
and John Palfrey relying on the same data. The data will be referred to as an author-
collective i.e. Deibert et.al. 2010. 
Legal texts & state documents 
I use legal text from current US law in order to trace the juridical limits of American data 
gathering. I see legal text to be highly relevant to track the norms of US data gathering-
practices as well as the legal extend of US data gathering regime, and I therefore use the laws 
concerning the area such as the law concerning electronic communication, the Bill of Rights 
and Executive Order 13618 by the President. Moreover, I employ other types of official state 
documents and rulings to gain insights into political decisions on the Internet and juridical 
bodies of data gathering and congressional advisory. The credibility of this material must be 
considered highest. Because I am not a law student or an expert in reading the law, I employ 
supplemental analysis of the legal texts and critical journalism in examining a given law. 
FISA 
I will focus on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 which is the legal basis for 
US Intelligence gathering and surveillance. I will take my points of departure in two of its 
amendments: The Protect America Act of 2007 and the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, as I 
found those amendments to be most relevant in relation to data gathering. I have 
deliberately chosen not to include the perhaps most controversial and notorious 
amendment, the Patriot Act of 2001. This is partly because a new amendment, the Freedom 
Act of 2015 was signed at 2nd of June, withdrawing some of the powers given through the 
Patriot Act (Froomkin 2015), and partly because it was implemented with less regards to the 
Internet and more to phone call surveillance. 
Obama Press Conference 
I employ the Speech Conference by Obama released shortly after the Snowden leaks as an 
expression of speech-acts to gain insight into the political response to these leaks. The 
transcription is an official release of the White House. 
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Meeting with Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (FE), Danish Defense Intelligence Service 
I arranged a meeting with the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (FE) to discuss parts of 
my thesis argumentation and Danish practices regarding data gathering. However, due to 
security regulations, I have no recording or transcription of the meeting and hence cannot 
refer to it directly as this would have consequences for the validity of my thesis’ conclusion. I 
gained a lot of knowledge and inspiration from the meeting, which I will apply in my 
argumentation but will instead argue for them in a scientific matter without direct reference. 
Therefore, there the reader cam validate all of my argumentation and conclusions in 
publically accessible empirical material. 
Limitations: Surveillance 
My empirical focus is on data gathering as method utilised by US Intelligence agencies 
particularly NSA. This material is often linked with issues of online surveillance so it might 
seem off the mark to examine data gathering instead of the issues concerning online 
surveillance. I will here outline the differences as I see them between these two phenomena, 
why I have chosen to work with data gathering and what the alternative surveillance-focus 
might entail and thus what is not covered in my thesis. 
Data gathering and surveillance are closely linked but are not the same. Data gathering is a 
method for surveillance used by particularly Intelligence agencies but surveillance can be 
conducted by other strategies; large-scale data gathering is one strategy and surveillance 
existed long before the Internet. Data gathering can also be used for other purposes than 
surveillance such as marketing analysis or population statistics and thus data gathering does 
not necessarily imply surveillance. The relationship between data gathering and surveillance 
is the same as between online surveillance and Internet security – the first is a means the 
other an end. However, since I work with empirical material concerning Intelligence data 
gathering, I recognise that it is mostly used for surveillance. 
Surveillance is a relevant perspective concerning data gathering-practices and I will here 
outline some scholars’ perspectives. Foucault’s governmentality-theory hold that 
surveillance is an inherent strategy by the state that disciplines and controls the population 
through constant surveillance, making the population govern themselves through bio-power. 
This way data gathering becomes a deliberate tool of control and the data gathering-practices 
of NSA are changing forms of surveillance (Radu 2014). Charles Tilly would add that 
surveillance constitute a powerful mechanism for state making, producing that high level of 
bureaucracy which is vital for re-producing state power but also vital for instating 
penetrative surveillance in a single centralized organisation. “We see an almost unbelievable 
attempt to extend the direct administrative purview of the central government to everyday 
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individual life. “ (Tilly 1990:112). This direct administrative purview is surveillance and 
creates states through administrating the population (Tilly 1985; Tilly 1990). A perspective 
inspired by James C. Scott hold that surveillance is an instrument of modern statecraft 
towards the idealised goal of standardisation and standardisation is a method to control 
citizens. This way, surveillance becomes a method to make it easier to control the population 
(Scott 1998). 
These are all parallel perspectives that could be examined using much of the same literature. 
I have chosen to delimit myself from this, not because I find it irrelevant but because I have 
chosen a less examined area. I am convinced that surveillance-studies will bring insights into 
data gathering practices and that research into data gathering as sovereignty wielding will 
bring insights into the practices of surveillance. I find it to be two parallel issues that should 
be treated in two different ways but can bring mutual insights. Thus, I delimit this thesis 
from the theories of surveillance yet acknowledge that it is a relevant perspective.  
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Chapter II: Analysis 
This chapter is the body of my thesis. I will begin with a pre-analysis of what data is and how 
data moves on the Internet. Thereafter I will proceed to my main analysis constituted by 
three subanalyses based in each of three theories in the same order as presented in chapter I: 
Krasner, Sassen and lastly Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen, answering my subquestions: 
I: Can the US current practices concerning data gathering and data regulation be categorised 
as control of flows? II: Which sovereign constellation of TAR is immanent in the US data 
gathering legislation? III: Does the US political reaction to Snowden’s leaks align with a 
contested sovereign defending itself? How are the US currently claiming sovereignty on the 
Internet? I will discuss the chapter’s argumentation in relation to my hypothesis and 
conclude on both in Chapter III. 
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What is Data? 
It would be obscure to begin a thesis on data gathering as a practice of Internet Sovereignty 
without addressing the question, what is data? I will therefore start by examining the object 
of my hypothesis – data, what data is and how it is organised online. 
Data is gathered both at social networks such as Facebook, Twitter; search engines such as 
Google, Yahoo, large-scale sale corporations such as Amazon, Ebay, health registers, and web 
communities such as Wikipedia, amongst many: this constitutes user data and is often 
forwarded to commercial corporations even in cases where the information originally wasn’t 
intended for them (Roberts & Palfrey 2010:41-43). Data is also gathered by malware – 
programmes, which infect users’ computers or install itself within another program, 
sometimes with the only purpose of gathering data. Much malware is produced by criminals 
but are increasingly also produced by states (Roberts & Palfrey 2010:46). While these two 
types of data are different because the data is gathered either voluntary with users 
submitting information or involuntary with the information being taken without the user’s 
consent, the raw data consist of the same - a code. While computer scientists work with 
constructing and using the code, what is more interesting for political scientists is how the 
data moves, what it contains and who controls it. Roberts & Palfrey create an image of the 
movements of data: 
 
“This digital information comes in the form of bits of data that flow through rivers and into 
oceans of data. These rivers are full of information that passes by a given point, or series of 
points, in a network and can be intercepted; these oceans are stocked with information that 
can be searched after the fact; and the rivers arise from springs that can be watched at the 
source. The data involved are held in private hands as well as public.” (Roberts & Palfrey 
2010:35). 
 
Data-code is ultimately the same but differs in what information it contains and how it is 
gathered. Big data means the gathering of large amounts of data and Metadata means the 
data on the data, which can reveal the type of the data, its recipient, sender, size etc. (Roberts 
& Palfrey 2010:39). When data is accumulated and stored into masses such as Big Data or 
Metadata it is combined. Combined data increases in value by more than what the individual 
elements justify because large quantities of data can reveal almost complete pictures of 
individual(s) lives, especially if the content and the context of the data is evident (Roberts & 
Palfrey 2010:43-45). Further combining data with other combined data presents pictures of 
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the lives of groups and entire populations. Thus, access to large-scale data brings almost 
unlimited knowledge about populations. While the raw data is merely code in different 
combinations it is through quantity as well as its content and context added value and thus 
constructed to be the phenomenon “data” containing information rather than the data-code 
itself. 
The topology of the Internet 
The Internet’s architecture consists of a multitude of actor-types internally linked in 
different ways. First are the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which provide access to the 
Internet to users. Users are the individuals and/or companies who use the Internet and 
whose information constitute much of the data accessible online. Servers are where data is 
stored in order to be available on the Internet and routers forward data packages between 
users. However, while there are many routers globally, all data traffic de facto goes through a 
small number of routers which are controlled by fewer than 100.000 so-called “autonomous 
systems” most of which are controlled by ISPs. Furthermore, geographically close 
“autonomous systems” are connected through so-called Internet Exchange Points of which 
there are fewer than 200 major of globally. Internet Exchange Points are only relevant in 
local data traffic whereas international data traffic is re-routed by the ISPs to other 
“autonomous systems” (Roberts & Palfrey 2010:39-40). While this is very technical, it does 
have important consequences concerning data. It shows that while the Internet might have 
an open and anarchic structure concerning billions of data packets exchanged between more 
than three billion users, most of this data goes through a much more narrow number of 
routers which are controlled by an even smaller number of “autonomous systems”, most 
often ISPs, and thus constitute potential control-points. Even more important, these control 
points have a geography and the individual links of Internet traffic are also owned by 
someone. This point to another important factor of data: routing information, which reveals 
where the data comes from and for who it was intended. All data reveals routing information 
about itself unless it has been encrypted and re-routed through proxy-servers; the first 
practice involves making the content of the data unreadable to outsiders, the other involves 
trafficking data through servers with different geographical positions in order to avoid 
detection (Roberts & Palfrey 2010:37-40). What this shows is that the perceived non-
geography of Internet data very much has a geography – both as imprinted in the data itself, 
but also through routing-information and through its control-points. While the info on the 
geography of the data can be concealed, a sender needs to take measures to ensure that the 
data’s geography remains unrevealed. Moreover, what we can see is that through routers the 
geographical borders of Internet data traffic becomes a blur and it is only the local traffic that 
is kept within a specific territorial border, while most data traffic pings between different 
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routers and servers placed in different geographies. This brings us to asking, can this data be 
controlled? I will examine this in following section. 
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Subanalysis I: Can the US current practices concerning 
data gathering and data regulation be categorised as 
control of flows? 
Krasner is relevant because he looks at the practices of a sovereign rather than the norms. He 
splits sovereignty into four types, one which is “…the ability to regulate the flow of 
information, ideas […] across the borders of their state.” (Krasner 1999:3) and is highly 
relevant when analysing data gathering as a measure to wield sovereignty. While the notion 
of control of flows only concerns flows crossing the state borders, most data traffic is pending 
between different geographical routers and servers and the majority of data traffic is 
therefore crossing state borders. I will here analyse whether Krasner’s theory can be 
corroborated in how the US handles data. I will answer the question: Can the US current 
practices concerning data gathering and data regulation be categorised as control of 
flows? While data gathering might not be the same as control of data, they are relating in 
that if a state can access and gather large amounts of data, there is very little stopping them 
from actually controlling the data. Furthermore, gathering data reveals some level of control 
over those points of entry through which the data flows and I therefore consider data 
gathering a passive behaviour in a spectrum of control-practices, where an active behaviour 
would be to censor or block data. I will examine the data gathering practices of NSA as the 
NSA is part of the US government. These will reveal whether the US is attempting to control 
flows through gathering data. Moreover, I will look at the filtering practices of the US state to 
see which attempts are made to filtrate the information available to the public. I will look at 
whether the US utilises “brute force” in controlling the Internet, which would build a 
stronger argument towards seeing the US as wielding sovereignty online and whether these 
practices should be considered a sovereign’s “control of flows”. 
What are NSA’s data gathering-practices? 
I will start by examining which tendencies of data gathering the so-called Snowden leaks 
expose. While it is not possible to confirm the content of Snowden’s leaks completely, I have 
in my methodology-section argued why they should be taken into consideration. 
Edward Snowden is a computer analyst who worked as an external consultant for NSA, 
giving him almost complete access to NSA databases and classified material. Through his 
work, he discovered the net of NSA surveillance, which he decided to publicise through 
journalists. He never revealed the complete database of classified documents to the public 
but instead sorted, distributed and, most often, conveyed through the people whom he gave 
access (Reitman 2013). Snowden’s leaks concern NSA surveillance programmes and my 
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analysis of them will take point of departure in the points of my limitations’-section; that 
surveillance is an end-target using data gathering as a tool. I will look at what the leaks 
reveal on how NSA gathered data and whether it can be considered “control of flows”. A 
complete list of contents of the leaks is available in appendix I. Through my analysis, I have 
identified a number of tendencies that I argue are evident in the NSA practices of data 
gathering as presented by Snowden’s material. I use cases drawn from the complete list of 
the leaks to deduce each tendency. I will discuss these tendencies below. 
Gathering data concerning non-targets and targets which are not criminal and/or terrorists 
An important tendency evident in Snowden’s material is that information is not just 
collected on the specific target of an intelligence operation; instead, it “…reveals that nine 
out of ten people whose communications the agency intercepts are not its targets.” (July 5, 
2014), making the subjects of collected data much broader than only those considered under 
reasonable suspicion. This is done to create maps of target’s social networks (August 21, 
2013; September 28, 2013; July 5, 2014). There are indicators that targets of the NSA 
surveillance are not just terrorists and criminals but also foreign system admins targeted 
because of their work as well as hacktivist groups that are deemed an ideological threat 
(March 20, 2014; May 12, 2014). This is an important tendency because it reveals that the 
targets of data gathering are not exclusively traditionally legitimate targets such as suspected 
criminals deemed to pose a direct threat against the stability of society. Instead, data is 
gathered on a broad scale on the general population. While it is argued to create “maps of 
target’s social networks” it seems obvious to question how widespread a target’s social 
network can be considered and thus how many people are considered related to a target. 
This indicates that the purpose is not just targeting specific suspects but more broadly, to 
access and gather large-scale amounts of data on much of the general population. 
Attaining access to the Internet’s backbone  
One of the most pronounced practices in the leaks is the NSA’s attempt to gain access to 
Internet backbones such as fibre optics or telecom-corporations’ data. By tapping into the 
larger fibre optics that carry the telephone and Internet traffic, data is stored into NSA’s own 
databases (July 10, 2013). Moreover, by gaining access to data held by the telecom-
corporations NSA can store vast amounts of metadata of their customers which contains 
information on sender, receiver, location, but also web searches, email activity and browsing 
histories of the users, while this data is contained for up to a year (September 30, 2013; 
October 14, 2013). There are two main strategies for attaining the access to these Internet-
infrastructural control points; one is to buy the access from the individual telecom or owners 
of the fibre optics. It is claimed that the NSA yearly spend hundreds of million dollars in 
paying private companies for access to large fibre optic communications backbones (August 
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29, 2013). Another practice is using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to 
order telecom-corporations to hand over the data (June 5, 2013).  
Using corporate partnerships to gain access to the physical backbones of the Internet seems 
to be a key strategy to gather data (November 1, 2013). While the Internet might be almost 
infinite in data, gaining access to the infrastructure creates control points in which the NSA 
can monitor all activity as well as gather it. The mere price of the claimed arrangements 
between telecom-corporations and NSA says something about the priority of the 
arrangements. This point towards a conscious strategy to control the physical control-points 
where most flows of data go through. 
Attaining access to the servers of private corporations 
Many of the worlds’ biggest IT companies are based in the US, placing their physical servers 
or headquarters within US jurisdiction. This is allegedly taken advantage of by the NSA, 
which has gained direct access to many Internet-based companies located in US including 
Apple, Google, Microsoft and Skype. The companies work collaboratively with and is paid by 
the NSA to help them circumvent encryption and privacy controls of the users’ data; the very 
same encryption and privacy controls that the users apply to conceal their data from 
outsiders (June 6, 2013; June 19, 2013). Another strategy is to target the data centres owned 
by these companies. The advantage is that data centres, unlike data traffic between user and 
company, are not encrypted, thus accessing data centres gives unlimited access to all 
content, search history, email, documents, etc., of the users of a certain company – not 
limited to US citizens (October 30, 2013). Smartphone Apps and online gaming seems to be 
another target for NSA data gathering, as well as collecting data on international monetary 
networks such as Visa and Mastercard, which can reveal detailed maps of a customer’s habits 
and geography (January 24, 2014; December 9, 2013; September 16, 2013).  
These practices creates a picture of tendency where the NSA taps into the servers of private 
corporations in order to pull data. The information on these servers is often, except 
concerning monetary networks, provided voluntarily for instance to create a profile 
containing personal information – as with e.g. facebook or dating-sites. These servers are 
rich in private information and the NSA take advantage of the US-based corporations’ 
leading dominance on the IT field. This is a point where the jurisdictional geography is used 
to gather data crossing the US borders, probably without the knowledge of the individual 
users. 
Using malware to pull data from users’ computers without their knowledge 
While the previous tendencies focused on how NSA taps into data, this tendency is on how 
the NSA creates programs called malware to target computers without owners’ knowledge. I 
37 
 
see a crucial difference between collecting information already “out there” on servers and 
cables, and creating malware specifically designed to gather data. The leaks suggest that NSA 
infected a vast amount of computers with malware specifically designed to remote control 
computers and access computers offline. Some of the tactics for placing malware includes 
using google or free airport Wi-Fi, phishing emails or fake versions of popular webpages 
(November 23, 2013; January 14, January 30 2014; 2014; March 12, 2014). Using “browser-
cookies” – malware placed for tracking purposes, is another strategy by the NSA to infiltrate 
computers (December 10, 2013). One case has been recognised by the NSA where two 
programmes gathered US citizens’ email metadata and cell phone metadata - systematically 
violating privacy laws, yet this case was claimed to be a result of poor management 
(November 19, 2013). Other documents suggest that the NSA collaborates with tech 
companies to implant so-called “back doors” in products and programmes connected to the 
Internet, which make it possible to access the product or program if holding the “key”-code 
(September 5, 2013; May 12, 2014). 
What is common for much data gathered through malware is that they are explicitly 
targeting non-US citizens and exclude data of US citizens (January 16, 2014). With malware, 
the agency specifically targets the type of information considered valuable. The information 
gathered and controlled by the NSA does not just constitute what is already on the Internet, 
but potentially all data on a device connected to the Internet. 
Collaborating with other countries’ intelligence agencies 
There is strong indication of the NSA using collaborations with other states to gain access to 
their intelligence material. They are either collaborating or sharing intelligence with 
following states: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand (the so-called “Five Eyes”), 
Netherlands, Sweden, Israel, Norway, Germany, and Turkey, as well as sharing intelligence 
internally with other US Intelligence agencies. Many of these Intelligence collaborations 
seem to be mainly for military purposes and thus concerning data on Afghanistan, Somalia, 
and/or Russia (October 31, 2013; March 5, 2014; December 5, 2013; September 11, 2013; 
April 26, 2014; June 18, 2014; August 25, 2014; August 31, 2014). Moreover, a leak claims 
that the NSA is participating in “third-party partnerships” with e.g. Germany and Denmark, 
where the states have agreed to host NSA equipment in exchange for gaining part of the 
information NSA gain this way (June 18, 2014). Moreover, there are indicators that the NSA 
and British Intelligence (GCHQ) share information, collaborate on operations and take 
advantage of loopholes in each other’s intelligence law (August 1, 2013; August 26, 2013; 
September 15, 2013; October 4, 2013). 
This trend concerns collaboration with foreign intelligence agencies to share information. 
Some of the Intelligence-sharing might be of military nature but given above tendencies it 
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would be naïve to consider the collaborations to only concern military operations. Instead, I 
argue that allied states, particularly US, are using each other’s capacity to increase their own 
scope of data control. These bonds of intelligence sharing might also be beneficiary on other 
issues than strictly Internet Governance and looking at the list of collaborative countries, 
they all seem to be part of those countries that generally share values and military 
campaigning-goals with the US. 
Gathering foreign data unauthorized by the foreign state 
There are indicators that the US is using practices of pulling information from a country’s 
server without their cooperation and/or authorization, from a whole list of countries and 
people spanning from China to Germany to France, and oil companies to UN  Secretary-
General and foreign diplomats (June 30, 2013; October 23, 2013; June 14, 2013; June 16, 
2013; September 2, 2013; July 9, 2013; November 2, 2013; October 21, 2013). Allegedly, 
there is a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court –order that gives “…NSA legal authority to 
collect information from or "concerning" every country except its four closest intelligence 
allies - Canada, the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. The order also authorizes the NSA to 
collect information on several international organizations, including the U.N., the World 
Bank and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.” (July 1, 2014). 
This practice of pulling data unknowingly from foreign states and international organisations 
presents a far more controversial tendency in light of jurisdictions and general respect for 
traditional sovereign territory as agreed upon internationally. I argue that this trend is about 
wielding the power to gather information concerning other states’ citizens on other states’ 
territory. This is particularly interesting when we reflect upon the ideas of territory; it seems 
that the US consider their territory to stretch much further than their jurisdiction. However, 
this practice is also relating to the practice of espionage, which have always been a part of 
states’ foreign relations especially in conflict. However, espionage often target the states’ 
enemies rather than their allies as this material suggest. This trend relates both to practices 
of espionage but also to above practice where states exchange intelligence information, 
however, without mutual consent.  
Do the six tendencies reflect a control of flows? 
My analysis show that the NSA employ six main tendencies in their data gathering practices. 
These are: Gathering data concerning non-targets and targets which are not criminal and/or 
terrorists, attaining access to the Internet’s backbone, attaining access to the servers of 
private corporations, using malware to unknowingly pull data from users computers, 
collaborating with other countries Intelligence agencies, and gathering foreign data 
unauthorized by the foreign state. All tendencies points towards an intensive culture of data 
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gathering by the NSA employing strategies of both targeting physical backbones of the 
Internet, private servers as well as creating malware and cooperative agreements with other 
states. Yet, the tendencies only suggests that the NSA gains access to, monitors and stores 
the data. So how does this align with the idea of control of flows? The gathering of data 
makes possible a control of flows because they already have access to vital parts of the 
Internet, which could be evolved to control of the data and of the people the data concerns. 
However, this is dependent on two points: 1) what they use the information for which we do 
not know, however, we must assume that the NSA does not just gather data for the sake of it 
but with an actual purpose. 2) How good they are at filtrating the information. Filtration is 
the process where amounts of data is being sorted, ordered and categorised. In practice when 
I log onto e.g. the local weather forecast, I also access a large number of for my purpose 
irrelevant data such as world weather, exchange rates, commercials, international news etc. 
This makes any tracking of a person’s actions online into an infinite data stream that needs 
to be filtered before it becomes usable (Ma et.al. 2008). Thus, a part of controlling flows is to 
store vast amounts of data but another part is to write programmes that can filtrate the 
collected data to find what is relevant for the purpose at hand. The leaks point at filtration 
being another strategic core of NSA data gathering practices, where they store data according 
to name, email, IP address, region and language as searchable factors (July 31, 2013). 
Moreover, there are indications that internal search engine programmes where created to 
filtrate all gathered data (January 16 2014; July 3 2014; August 25 2014). This is important 
because it makes the data usable and underpins the idea that this information is not just 
stored but gathered strategically for a purpose, thus increasing the value of the gathered 
data. Yet, we can only assume that the data is being used, not prove it. 
Therefore, what this section has proven is that there is widespread monitoring and gathering 
of data. I argue that we can consider these practices as in the passive end of control of flows 
containing potential for actual control, in the sense that while actions of control are not 
happening, the scope of the net of data gathering makes control entirely possible. There is 
monitoring of the flows of data crossing the US borders by a US governmental body, which 
could be wielded as control in future. This practice seems so penetrative of any data traffic, 
particularly the traffic crossing US’ borders, that it might be considered a practice crucial for 
the states’ activities on the Internet itself. However, the control of flows-strategy is limited in 
scope by focusing more on non-US citizens than US citizens. This way it seems that the US is 
more inclined to gather and control data beyond their geographical territory and jurisdiction 
than within it. 
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The US’ filtering practices 
Control of flows is not just to gather data nor to monitor data traffic. Control is the ability to 
regulate and filter which flows of information and ideas that are available to the population. 
This type of filtration should not be confused with filters or filtering practices used to search 
within or organise data, instead it concerns the regulatory filtering methods used to block 
what the population can access. Therefore, I will look at which filtering practices are utilized 
by the US on data streams’ availability to the population. I will use a set of cases picked from 
the OpenNet Initiative’s (ONI) material. ONI describe the US filtering practices as resting on 
content removal rather than blocking or censoring content. The Internet itself is much 
regulated compared to other countries but not through means of technical filtering (Deibert 
et.al. 2010:369). Instead, the content removal occurs mostly at private level through 
particularly ISPs, not at governmental level, and is driven by mostly voluntary regulatory 
initiatives rather than statutory, which reveals the trouble for US government to implement 
regulatory measures. 
Minors, child pornography, gambling and copyright 
One of the biggest debates on Internet censorship is protecting minors against harmful 
content and the hindrance of child pornography-distribution. The first attempts at regulating 
the Internet in the US was in the 1990s with the purpose of protecting minors from explicit 
sexual content on the Internet. However, “Since that time, several legislative attempts at 
creating a mandatory system of content controls in the United States have failed to produce 
a comprehensive solution for those pushing for tighter controls.” (Deibert et.al. 2010:369). 
While the Congress tried battling the Internet’s exposure of material deemed harmful or 
indecent to minors through the so-called Communications Decency Act of 1996, which would 
criminalize the transmission of “indecent” material to persons under 18. However, most of 
the content of the law-proposal was deemed unconstitutional and hence neglected by the US 
Supreme Court. Instead, the US are currently using the Children’s Internet Protection Act of 
2000 to force public schools to use Internet filtering and blocking technologies in return for 
federal funding, which they are economically dependent on. The battle against child 
pornography has been more straightforward as both possession and distribution are 
considered criminal acts by the US. Generally, child pornography is removed by ISPs or 
server hosts whenever a removal request is being made by e.g. National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children. More long term, systems have been implemented by some of the 
biggest telecom-corporations and ISPs to rapidly identify child pornography and users’ 
complaints of same as well as stop supporting access to certain fora identified as source of 
child pornography, yet these measures are voluntary, not statutory. When Pennsylvania on 
state level tried forcing ISPs to block access to certain sites, the court deemed the regulation 
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unconstitutional (Deibert et.al. 2010:370-373). Thus, while the law is clear-cut and the 
practices of removing content is well-used, there is, even on one of the areas most agreed 
upon, not support for utilising blocking filters or measures of censorship. Online gambling is 
another area subject to Internet filtering. The US legislation Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act of 2006 prohibits the transfer of funds to gambling sites and prohibits 
betting and poker sites from knowingly accepting money from US-based customers. Any 
further attempt to limit online gambling or requiring ISPs to block gambling sites has been 
overturned in court (Deibert et.al. 2010:375ff). Lastly, copyright infringement is a huge issue 
in the debates of Internet filtering. Copyright infringement is, unlike above issues, about 
protecting the property of a publisher – often the movie and music industry. Legally, the 
ISPs and server hosts are according to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 free 
from liability for harbouring material of copyright infringement: 
 
“Where a service provider unknowingly transmits, caches, retains, or furnishes a link to 
infringing material by means of an automatic technical process, it is protected from 
liability so long as it promptly removes or blocks access to the material upon notice of a 
claimed infringement.” (Deibert et.al. 2010:377). 
 
Thus, in the case of copyright infringement the practices are still relying on content removal 
upon request. However, because of the high risk of subpoenas from the copyright holders 
there is an indirect tendency towards censoring as ISPs often take down material based on 
user complaints that are rarely questioned. Therefore, critics are claiming that the practices 
are nearing a violation of the freedom of speech as well as measures of censorship (Deibert 
et.al. 2010:376-379). 
Considering the cases of Internet filtering above it is clear that in even normatively 
straightforward cases such as child pornography the state is struggling to implement 
blocking or censoring measures. It seems that regulations are tighter with concerns to 
copyright infringement and online gambling. This is revealing on regulatory politics, which 
seem to favour profit-making businesses rather than protection of minors. In the cases of 
protecting minors, the state resides to some sort of semi-voluntary option where they do not 
force schools and libraries to wield blocking filters, but instead use financial incentives to 
encourage them to apply such. Therefore, blocking is almost never resorted to as filtering 
method; instead, the usage of content removal upon request is the preferred filtering method 
in US. 
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Can the US’ filtering practices be considered control of flows? 
I previously argued that the state is engaging in complete monitoring of Internet traffic 
crossing the border and is currently facilitating a potential for wielding control of data. 
However, when we analyse the US domestic filtering practices we see that they are currently 
based on content removal, which accepts that the illicit material must be publicised before it 
can be removed. We see that even with issues such as child pornography there is little 
support to utilising technologies of blocking, which are repeatedly deemed unconstitutional. 
Thus, it seems that while the US’ practices of data gathering are strong externally, i.e. on 
foreigners, data crossing state borders, and on collecting data owned by US corporations, it is 
internally rather weak as it can barely regulate what is available to its own population. The 
only exceptions to this is the cases of protecting the profit of copyright holders against 
infringement and hindering online gambling. Therefore, the wielding of strong and active 
control of flows measures such as blocking and censoring cannot be substantiated; the US is 
not strongly utilising active control mechanisms on the Internet. Therefore, the US filtering 
practices are fairly far from what we would categorise as a de facto “control of flows”. 
Is the US utilising brute force on the Internet? 
Krasner points to a specific aspect of interdependence sovereignty that complies the state to 
use brute force to practice its control of flows. Brute force is the absolute ability to control 
the movements of flows across a state’s own borders, essentially the ability to shut down the 
flows (Krasner 1999:10). However, are the practices of the NSA “brute force”? Looking at 
abovementioned material there seems to be no straight answer. I will here look at whether 
the US have an evident “kill switch” of the Internet to confirm or deny whether we could view 
the practices as an expression of brute force. This will create a complete picture of whether 
we can consider the acts of data gathering on the Internet as an expression of control of flows 
with the US as a sovereign. 
Kill switch as expression of brute force 
While the Internet was previously considered a private good, a so-called “information 
services”, it was on February 26th 2015 re-categorised as a “common carrier” by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). The category “common carrier” makes the Internet 
subject to the legislation of the Communications Act of 1934. This Act creates legal 
foundation for a state-owned kill switch of any electronic device within the US jurisdiction, 
now including the Internet (FCC 2015; Morrison 2015). This “kill switch” is only to be used 
in states of emergencies and only by the president of the US as stated in the Act itself:  
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“(c) Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a threat of war, or a state 
of public peril or disaster or other national emergency, or in order to preserve the 
neutrality of the United States, the President, if he deems it necessary in the interest of 
national security or defense, may suspend or amend, for such time as he may see fit, the 
rules and regulations applicable to any or all stations or devices capable of emitting 
electromagnetic radiations within the jurisdiction of the United States…”  (Communications 
Act of 1934: SEC. 706.). 
 
The idea of giving the US President the power to turn off the Internet in states of 
emergencies was also authorised in Executive Order 13618 “Assignment of National Security 
and Emergency Preparedness Communications Functions” from July 6th 2012. This gave the 
president the power to seize facilities of ISPs’ and shut down Internet communications. 
However, the main purpose of the Executive Order is to ensure that the Federal Government 
has the ability to communicate at all times, particularly in times of emergency: 
 
“The Secretary of Homeland Security shall: (a) oversee the development, testing, 
implementation, and sustainment of NS/EP communications, including: communications 
that support Continuity of Government; Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal 
emergency preparedness and response communications; non-military executive branch 
communications systems; critical infrastructure protection networks; and non-military 
communications networks, particularly with respect to prioritization and restoration; […] 
(e) satisfy priority communications requirements through the use of commercial, 
Government, and privately owned communications resources, when appropriate;” 
(Executive Order 13618 2012: Sec. 5.2.). 
 
The formulation in (a) practically opens the possibility for Homeland Security to develop, 
test, implement and sustain any communication stream, including non-military systems; 
ultimately authorising the installing of kill switches on non-military parts of the Internet 
such as commercial ISPs. The formulation in (e) involves that Homeland Security is 
permitted to practically seize any communication resources in order to satisfy their own 
“priority communication” – in effect, shut them down; at least these are the interpretations 
put forward by critics (Anthony 2012; Kerr 2012; Liebelson 2013). Effectively, these 
documents present the possibility of a kill switch and makes it clear that the US will use 
brute force to control the Internet in situations of national emergency. 
44 
 
Is the US controlling flows? 
This analysis shows that the US particularly through the NSA have a great level of 
monitoring capability of the flows of information and ideas crossing the state. It also shows 
that the NSA data gathering capabilities are dependent on the telecom-companies and 
owners of fibre optics as well as ISPs and private corporations to gather data for them. Most 
data is pulled from other data holders and in terms of being able to control the internal flows 
of information and ideas the space for filtering is very limited. While the US presents high 
levels of monitoring and data gathering capability that could facilitate a control of flows, they 
also seem dependent on other agents outside the state apparatus. They, in essence, do not 
“own” most of the data but instead “rent” it from other actors. The agents who “own” the 
data are, however, subject to US jurisdiction. The fact that the US jurisdiction covers many 
big international servers and IT-companies increases its control. However, the proof that the 
flows crossing the state borders are controlled rather than just monitored are still lacking 
and thus my argument is that the US has the ability for potential control of flows but not 
currently engaging in it as their measures of control are too passive. Especially the lack of 
national filtering mechanisms to block or censor further indicates that a de facto active 
control of flows is absent. However, the fact that we can effectively pinpoint the legal base for 
an Internet kill switch creates basis for understanding the US as a sovereign controller of 
flows but with weak day-to-day controlling measures, instead counterbalanced by an 
ultimate doomsday-scenario plan. This underlines the sovereign position of the US on the 
Internet. 
What is interesting is that while it is generally perceived that states’ ability to control flows, 
their interdependence sovereignty, is put under pressure by technological advancements, it 
seems that the NSA uses these technological advancements to strengthen their sovereignty 
through penetrating the data, both alone and by cooperating with other states and agents. 
Furthermore, there seems to be different regulatory measures taken between internal and 
external flows in that the flows internal in the US described as filtering practices are 
regulated significantly lesser than external flows which are subject to widespread data 
monitoring and gathering practices; This fits with Krasner’s idea that control of flows target’s 
flows crossing state borders. Yet, what is the legal basis for data gathering for the US? How 
widespread is the territory and can we confirm a distinction between US citizens and US 
territory vs. non-US citizens and foreign territory? I will examine these questions next. 
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Subanalysis II: Which sovereign constellation of TAR is 
immanent in the US data gathering legislation? 
Sassen’s work is relevant because she deconstructs what constitutes the concept of 
“sovereignty” into three concepts: Territory, Authority, and Rights as well as an 
organisational logic that brings the three concepts together; all concepts that are empirically 
feasible. In analysing a “new” aspect of sovereignty - data gathering, in a new field – the 
Internet, it becomes extremely relevant to analyse the scope and limits of sovereignty as 
concept in order to trace whether the practices of data gathering as conducted by the US 
state apparatus can be qualified as a sovereign constellation. In this sense, Sassen’s notion of 
a sovereign constellation, a capability, of TAR aids in tracking individual features of 
sovereignty. Fundamentally, the most relevant law concerning data gathering as practice of 
the US state is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The act have 
undergone a number of amendments in the 21st century in which I will take my point of 
departure. The main amendment is the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 while I will also use 
the Protect America Act of 2007. The question I answer in this chapter is which sovereign 
constellation of TAR is immanent in the US data gathering legislation? This question will 
gain insights into how data gathering wields sovereignty. I will analyse the individual 
elements in sections, though I have messed with the order of TAR in the analysis because it 
was more relevant to analyse Rights before Authority. I will therefore first analyse Territory, 
then Rights, Authority and lastly the organisational logic that binds together all three 
elements. 
What is the Territory of data gathering? 
Territory is a measure of the scope of a capability of TAR, the answer to the question Where 
lies the limits of this order? In the previous subanalysis, I pointed at a geographical 
distinction where data inside the US is regulated more weakly than data outside the borders. 
However, what does the US data gathering law tell about the borders and territorial limits of 
US data gathering territory? I will examine this here. 
The difference between being located within and outside the US 
While any concrete description of the territorial scope of the FISA legislation is absent, the 
legislation presents the same distinction as NSA’s data gathering practices between targeting 
inside or outside the US borders. FISA is focusing on the people whom it targets as either 
reasonable believed to be in the United States, or reasonably believed to be outside the 
United States. It differs between “United States persons” and all other persons, with United 
States persons referring to “…a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for 
46 
 
permanent residence […] an unincorporated association a substantial number of members 
of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States…” (FISA 1978: Title 
I,i). It is harder for the Intelligence to target people located inside the US or deemed “US 
persons”. In addition, FISA requires heightened standards or reasons for surveillance on US 
citizens than non-US citizens (Justice Information Sharing 2013). This is evident in the 
amendment of 2007, the Protect America Act: 
 
“Sec. 105A. 
Clarification of electronic surveillance of persons outside the United States 
Nothing in the definition of electronic surveillance under section 101(f) shall be construed to 
encompass surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of 
the United States.“ (FISA 2007). 
 
In other words, people located outside the borders of the US are explicitly excluded from the 
procedures of “electronic surveillance”. Electronic surveillance requires warrants (FISA 
1978: Title I, f(1)) and so by excluding the data gathering of people outside the US borders 
from being subject to “electronic surveillance”, the US are excluding themselves from 
needing warrants in order to gather data on them. A similar distinction presents itself in the 
2008 FISA amendments: 
 
“Sec. 702. 
Sec. 702 Procedures for targeting certain persons outside the United States 
other than United States persons 
(a) 
Authorization - 
[…] the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may 
authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the 
authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information. 
 (b)  Limitations - 
An acquisition authorized under subsection (a)— 
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(1)  may not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be 
located in the United States; 
(2)  may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a 
particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; 
(3)  may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States; 
(4)  may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and 
all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in 
the United States; and 
(5)  shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.” (FISA 2008:Sec. 702) 
 
The limitations above states that targeting persons located in the United States, or even 
targeting persons outside the US with the intension of targeting a US person, is illegal. 
Moreover, targeting US citizens or groups known to be located within the US is considered a 
violation. Any conduction of surveillance is required to be consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, a part of the Bill of Rights to which I shall return in the “Rights”-section. 
Where are the limits to the territory of US data gathering? 
What does above distinction reveal about the territory of data gathering? It reveals a huge 
difference in the US states’ practices of data gathering whether you are a US or non-US 
citizen and whether a person is located within or outside the US territory. There is clear 
indication that the geography of the US is also the territory of US data gathering, which 
makes sense because data gathering is conducted by a government body, the NSA. However, 
what is interesting is that data gathering has legal foundation for being more penetrative 
outside the US jurisdiction than inside. In this sense, the practice of data gathering leaves a 
protective sphere around the territory of the US where it is less evident and instead focuses 
on data crossing the borders or located outside its territory. Data gathering as practice does 
not constitute an exclusive authority over a given territory (Sassen 2008:6). However, the 
territory of the US is still “reigned” but the “exclusive authority” signifies that the 
geographical territory of the US is not subject to the same data gathering measures as the 
rest of the world. Thus, there is a clear territorial demarcation of data gathering as practice of 
sovereignty, just of opposite regulatory strength than what is expected. Yet, this territorial 
understanding is focusing on the legislation, as there is much to suggest that the US citizens 
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and people located within the US geography are also de facto targets of extensive data 
gathering. 
What is the Rights of data gathering? 
It is evident that a gap exists between what data gathering measures are being utilised on 
citizens of or located within the US and those who are not. Here I will approach the rights 
that create this distinction and limits the actions of the Authority of the sovereign 
constellation. The concept of “Rights” describes the standard of norms or rights that regulate 
both the ruler and the ruled as well as what the authority is allowed to do to its subjects and 
the boundaries of legitimate actions. Rights thus reflects more constitutional rights which 
protect the individual citizen from the state as well as limit what the state is able to do to its 
citizens. Here I will analyse the US constitution’s “Bill of Rights” as the foundation for the 
Rights that regulate the relation between citizens and authority. The Fourth Amendment is 
referred to explicitly in the FISA legislation cited above, the Procedures for targeting certain 
persons outside the United States other than United States persons in FISA Amendment of 
2008; this underlines the importance of the Bill of Rights. 
First and Fourth Amendment 
The rights protecting the US citizens as well as the rights that limit the scope of the political 
actions of the US states are those written in the Bill of Rights. More specifically, it is the First 
and Fourth Amendment that are most importance for data gathering initiatives. These are 
also ascribed the main reason why the filtering methods of the US, as described in first 
subanalysis, are weak and suffers from mostly voluntary arrangements out of fear of limiting 
the freedom of speech as upheld in the First Amendment. Therefore, “…many government-
mandated attempts to regulate content have been barred on First Amendment grounds, 
often after lengthy legal battles.” (Deibert et.al. 2010:370). The First Amendment states 
that: 
 
“Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 
(Bill of Rights). 
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The freedom of speech is the freedom from governmental intrusion or prohibition. It is 
absolute in that the freedom of speech must not be violated in any law. This Amendment is 
important in the context of the Internet, as the Internet constitutes a flow of Information 
which thus cannot be violated in expression. Many bills e.g. in the field of protecting minors 
through content regulation have been rejected because they were not deemed the least 
restrictive alternative (Deibert et.al. 2010:371). The logic of least restrictive alternative 
complies that any measure to limit the freedom of speech should be the very least restrictive, 
in order to protect the freedom of speech most against government intrusion. This is a 
fundamental law limiting the scope of action for the state, which hence cannot limit speech 
or messages for political- or any other purposes. This is a law clearly regulating the 
government’s scope for action on the Internet. 
Perhaps even more important concerning the field of data gathering is the Fourth 
Amendment stating that: 
 
“Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (Bill of Rights). 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual from unreasonable searches, requiring 
warrants and probable cause to conduct searches or confiscations. This is the law protecting 
the US citizens against surveillance and the law that needs to be respected when conducting 
data gathering targeting US citizens. If we consider data gathering as a search of an 
individual’s property i.e. their computer and private email, online profiles etc., the Fourth 
Amendment protects the individual from such data gathering practices. The link between 
pulling private data from the Internet and the Fourth Amendment is made clear in the FISA 
Amendment of 2008, which, as quoted in full-length above, states that any “…targeting of 
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign 
intelligence information. […](5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” (FISA 2008:Sec. 702). In theory, this 
should protect any person under the Fourth Amendment, however, as critics have argued, 
FISA requires heightened standards for US citizens rather than non-US citizens (Justice 
Information Sharing 2013). This emphasises another point in FISA law that some of the 
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content is ambiguous and contradicting e.g. stating that foreigners are subject to the Fourth 
Amendment while circumventing this right by making it easier to conduct electronic 
surveillance on foreigners than on US citizens. Critics emphasize that the effective result of 
the FISA Amendment of 2008 is that it requires no warrant or reasonable suspicion to 
gather a wide array of emails and Internet data targeting non-US citizens or persons believed 
to be outside the US as well as any data traffic crossing the US borders. While the FISA only 
requires warrants when targeting a person or domestic data traffic, any time communication 
is conducted with foreigners, crossing state borders, it is deemed located outside the US and 
thus a warrant is not needed (Greenwald 2013). The data crossing state borders is also 
deemed most valuable to the US, as put forward by former Director of NSA, Central 
Intelligence and National Intelligence, Michael Hayden.  
 
“…there are no communications more important to the safety of the Homeland than those 
affiliated with al Qa'ida with one end in the United States. And so why should our laws 
make it more difficult to target the al Qa'ida communications that are most important to 
us--those entering or leaving the United States!.” (Hayden 2006). 
 
The threat of terrorists crossing state borders is what animates the legislation’s focus on 
foreign data traffic and the reason why data traffic abroad or crossing US borders is less 
restricted. This results in unequal rights between US citizens enjoying more rights than non-
US citizens. 
What is the Authority of data gathering? 
This leads us to analyse the Authority of this sovereign constellation. Authority is who or 
what rules most vivid in identifying whom or what legitimates Territory and Rights in the 
capability. While we may immediately be able to point at the US as being the Authority of 
data gathering, Sassen makes us aware that TAR is assembling and disassembling at 
different levels both within and beyond the state. This makes the specific institutions, actors 
or bodies that hold any type of Authority important and thus “the United States” as authority 
is an insufficient analysis to fit our needs. Instead, I examine the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, which is the explicit legal power of FISA-legislation. 
The role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
While the constitutional rights protecting the citizens against data gathering is clear, there 
seems to be more dispute when court orders permitting surveillance is being ordered. In the 
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FISA-regime, the judicial power is the so-called Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC). FISC was established in correlation with FISA of 1978 to handle applications for 
warrants. While its job is to manage applications, the Department of Justice has an almost 
perfect record in obtaining the surveillance warrants and other powers requested from FISC 
(Federal Juridical Center 2015). In the years between 1979 and 2013 a total number of 12 
FISA applications have been rejected and 532 applications required modified by FISC. This 
should be compared to the number of 35.434 approved requests during the same period 
(EPIC 2015), resulting in a success-rate for applied warrants of above 98% in FISA. While 
some argue this proves that the juridical personal of the US states applying for warrants are 
of high standard and knows the system, I will agree with the critics claiming that this success 
rate is too high and points to FISC as giving more or less carte blanch to the Intelligence 
agencies and Justice Department (Powell 2013). In this sense, while FISC might be the 
official authority which rule according to FISA legislation as well as protector of the rights of 
the citizens as stated in the Bill of Rights, their political independent authority seems to be 
relative and dependent on the Intelligence and surveillance agencies of the US themselves. 
While FISC is the official body, they seem to work for the Intelligence agencies and the 
Department of Justice. The judges in FISC are all appointed by the Chief Justice of US 
Supreme Court and more importantly, so are the judges of the Foreign Surveillance Court of 
Review designed to review and oversee the decisions of FISC (Chu 2014:ii; Federal Juridical 
Center 2015). This combined with the success-rate of applications for warrants indicates a 
system with different bodies that might officially oversee each other but containing no real 
checks and balances. This is also evident in the fact that all applications are solely presented 
by the accuser and no system of legal defence rivalling the government exists within the FISA 
system. Therefore, I will point at the Department of Justice as the Authority in FISA-
legislation represented by an un-checked and un-balanced FISC. 
Organizational logic 
So what organisational logic brings together these three elements and legitimises its rule? 
The concept of organizational logic deconstructs how a certain order of TAR legitimises 
itself, its actions and at what premises. In the original FISA law of 1978 an element of 
organizational logic occurs when the law defines what constitutes “Foreign intelligence 
information” and what it protects against. The law says: 
 
“(e) “Foreign intelligence information” means – 
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(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, 
the ability of the United States to protect against – 
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power ; 
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power ; or 
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a 
foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power ; or 
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and 
if concerning a United States person is necessary to – 
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States ; or 
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” (FISA 1978: Title I, 
Sec. 101). 
 
What defines the purpose of foreign intelligence information is to protect the US against 
actual or potential attacks from foreign powers, sabotage or terrorism, as well as foreign 
intelligence activities of secretive nature. Foreign intelligence is gathered with the purpose of 
strengthening “…the national defense or security of the United States…” (ibid.). We see that 
the organisational logic of the FISA-reign, or reign of data gathering, is driven by the logic of 
protecting the state against security threats. Moreover, I argue that it is driven by the fear of 
terrorism against the US, an agenda that have strengthened in the post 9/11-context. The 
immanent logic is that through control and gathering of foreign information the US can 
protect itself against actual or potential attacks as long as it is gathering enough of the right 
data. Thus, the purpose of data gathering becomes to protect the US against threats and 
attacks either from foreign powers or from terrorism, which is the logic that justifies the 
penetrative nature of FISA legislation and territory. This logic also relies on the idea that any 
person not planning attacks against the US has nothing to worry about from this legislation, 
since it only targets actual or potential threats. This organisational logic justifies why the 
rights of US citizens are more protected than foreigners’ rights as well as why 
communication crossing state borders is deemed most interesting because terrorism against 
the US state coming from outside is deemed the main threat. This points towards a defence 
of the US territory and US citizens as paramount and perhaps whether the authority of this 
reign can be transparent, just and reliable then comes second.  
Thus, the sovereign constellation immanent in the FISA-legislation relies on a security-
agenda, the justice department and the intelligence agencies as well as the US constitution. 
TAR has assembled very close to the US state and the main deviation is the ambiguous 
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understanding of territory where content deemed outside the national territory are greater 
targets than content deemed inside. In this sense, data gathering is legally not independent 
from the state but highly related to and dependent on the US’ general activities. 
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Subanalysis III: Does the US political reaction to 
Snowden’s leaks align with a contested sovereign 
defending itself & How are the US claiming sovereignty on 
the Internet? 
The final part of my analysis take point of departure in the theory by Rebecca Adler-Nissen & 
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen. Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen are relevant because they 
highlight the pragmatic political claim to sovereignty as expressed through speech-acts. 
Moreover, their work emphasises new constellations of sovereignty such as the claim for 
extra-territorialization. Their view that the sovereign reveals itself at a time of crisis is 
relevant when approaching data gathering strategies as political tools in US. They provide 
my analysis with insights into whether the Internet can be considered subject to sovereignty 
claims through political practices of data gathering. I will answer the two questions: Does the 
US political reaction to Snowden’s leaks align with a contested sovereign defending itself? 
How are the US currently claiming sovereignty on the Internet? I will analyse the speech 
conference by Obama in relation to Snowden’s leaks to see whether it reflects a sovereign in 
crisis. Moreover, I will compare this to two current cases of change in the US politics of the 
Internet, ICANN and the Net Neutrality-case, to analyse if or how the US claims sovereignty 
on the Internet itself, including its data. 
How sovereignty reveals itself when put under pressure 
A fundamental assumption in Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen’s theory is that 
sovereignty is most evident when put under pressure: “it is in a time of crisis that what is 
ordinarily taken for granted needs to be most vigorously defended” (Adler-Nissen & 
Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:8). Therefore, the sovereign would evidently reveal itself when 
put under pressure and/or challenges from within or outside. This is a focus on the political 
context and if we consider data gathering-practices as wielding sovereignty, we must expect 
that an attempt such as Snowden’s leaks to reveal these practices would create backlash and 
be met by political defence of the practices. I will look at the Press conference by Obama as 
response to the Snowden leaks, where these characteristics of a sovereign defending itself 
could be evident. Asking: Is the Obama’s statements in the press conference an expression of 
defence of a sovereign in a time of crisis? I will structure the analysis around themes that are 
recurring in the conference. 
Framing data gathering as driven by security-first 
The most outspoken tendency in the Obama’s Press Conference is framing the practices of 
data gathering as issues of security first created to protect against the threats from outside 
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US borders. The practices as revealed by Snowden are framed with reference to the threat of 
terrorism: “…this program is an important tool in our effort to disrupt terrorist plots.“ 
(Obama 2013). The logic of this argument is that these terrorist plots are hiding within the 
Internet communication and it is only by monitoring them through complex programmes 
this threat can be detected. “We now have to unravel terrorist plots by finding a needle in 
the haystack of global telecommunications. And meanwhile, technology has given 
governments -- including our own -- unprecedented capability to monitor 
communications.” (ibid.). The vindication for the programmes is found in the idea that the 
US “…can prevent a terrorist attack, where we can get information ahead of time…” (ibid.). 
This particular articulation of data gathering as a question of security is further outlined by 
the fact that the President articulates himself through his military position as Commander-
in-Chief already in second sentence (Obama 2013). Justifying data gathering practices 
through the threat of terrorism is, as also evident in FISA, an exceedingly important trend in 
the US policies of Internet Governance. 
Downplaying the leaks 
What is interesting is that despite the Press Conference being held in relation to the critique 
raised of NSA practices in Snowden’s leaks, Snowden’s role is severely downplayed. 
Snowden’s name is only mentioned seven times by the President, only in answers and only 
after being called twice by journalists asking questions. This indicates a strategic framing of 
the Press Conference to not directly concern the leaks but instead focus on justifying NSA’s 
data gathering measures as well as to situate the President in relation to the scepticism 
arriving from these documents. When questioned with the attitude towards Snowden’s 
person and whether his leaks should be considered whistleblowing, Obama answers: “No, I 
don’t think Mr. Snowden was a patriot. As I said in my opening remarks, I called for a 
thorough review of our surveillance operations before Mr. Snowden made these leaks.” 
(Obama 2013). This is in stark contrast with his praising of the work of the Intelligence 
community: “The men and women of our intelligence community work every single day to 
keep us safe because they love this country and believe in our values. They're patriots.” 
(ibid.). 
It is worth noting that the President emphasises his own reviews of the data gathering 
programs initiated before the leaks became public while upholding “…that Mr. Snowden has 
been charged with three felonies…” (ibid.). This tells us that despite his own reviews and 
whistleblower-programs designed to catch exactly the kind of criticism raised by Snowden, 
the President has no intentioned of justifying the claims put forward by the leaks and instead 
downplays the role of Snowden himself, framing the leaks as a felony, rather than 
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whistleblowing. What this says is that the President has no intention of pursuing the critic 
coming from Snowden but rather to pursue his own reviews instead. 
Stressing the importance for transparency 
This opens for the final main tendency from this Press conference. One of the points from 
the Press Conference is that security and freedom should be in balance – or rebalanced, as he 
puts it (Obama 2013). Obama recognises the need for more transparency on the work of 
Intelligence agencies as well as to meet the concerns and scepticism the leaks have raised. He 
puts forward a new more transparent politics of data gathering: “…we can, and must, be 
more transparent…” (ibid.), further highlighting how increased transparency should be 
followed by “…constraints on the use of this authority.” (ibid.). Moreover, he stresses his 
confidence in the FISC-court and the system of FISA to be able to balance security and 
privacy: “… while I’ve got confidence in the [FISC-]court and I think they’ve done a fine job, 
I think we can provide greater assurances that the court is looking at these issues from both 
perspectives -- security and privacy.” (ibid.). However, the truly interesting question is 
whether this increased transparency also implies decreasing the level of data gathering. 
There is no indication on this. The level of data gathering is not linked to a wish for 
transparency because, following the logic of the argument, data gathering is strictly 
conducted for security reasons and strictly targeting persons under reasonable suspicion. 
This leads back to my initial question, are data gathering-practices defended in this Press 
Conference which timing correlates with the Snowden leaks? I argue that any random or 
broad data gathering is denied. Instead, all data gathering programs are justified as security 
measures. I argue that this indicates that some part of sovereignty is at stake because in this 
time of crisis where the actions of the state agency, NSA, is questioned and critiqued instead 
of claiming that the actions are due to some sort of “bad apples”, the President claims that all 
the actions are justifiable to protect the state. He calls for more transparency but that is to 
meet the critique of the programmes, not to withdraw them. This correlates with the 
argument that “it is in a time of crisis that what is ordinarily taken for granted needs to be 
most vigorously defended” (Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008:8) and indicates the 
data gathering practices as a sovereign measure. 
Sovereignty claims – Three horizontal moves 
A corner stone of Adler-Nissen & Gammeltoft-Hansen’s theory is sovereignty as claims to 
sovereignty - as a game of moves. In this context it is the horizontal sovereignty moves that 
are relevant. The focus is on how sovereignty is played out as legal and political practices 
often facilitated by international institutions or private corporations. The horizontal move 
claims sovereignty on an area otherwise considered outside sovereign control and territory – 
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also known as extra-territorialization. If data gathering is a sovereignty measure on the 
Internet, we must assume that political claims are trying to claim the Internet itself to gain a 
better control of data streams. In this section, I compare three cases of US’ sovereign claims 
on the Internet. I use excerpts from the analysis of the Obama Press Conference to see 
whether data gathering itself constitute a horizontal move for sovereignty. I compare this 
with two current cases of political transformation within the US management of the Internet, 
ICANN and the Net Neutrality-case, to examine whether the US is tightening or loosening its 
claim of the Internet and whether its current regulatory measures qualify as extra-
territorialization. While these cases are not concerning data gathering, the US claims for 
sovereignty on the Internet has consequences for data gathering as practices: a high level of 
sovereignty claim would create greater access to gathering data and a higher level of 
legitimacy for such actions. 
Claim for data gathering 
Looking at above analysis of Obama’s Press Conference, we can see that yes, there is an 
attempt at claiming sovereignty through defending data gathering as method to protect the 
US population against threats. Moreover, we can see that data gathering on the Internet is 
highly justified by the state as long as it is not random and as long as it is not targeting US 
citizens without reasonable suspicion i.e. warrants. However, if data gathering does not 
target US citizens – that is, the citizen of the sovereign itself, then it targets non-US citizens 
and foreigners. This act in itself is a measure of spreading sovereignty beyond own territory, 
claiming that what goes on beyond the jurisdiction of the US is of high relevance to the US 
itself. “Our intelligence is focused, above all, on finding the information that’s necessary to 
protect our people, and -- in many cases -- protect our allies.” (Obama 2013). In this sense, 
any information necessary to protect US citizens and allies is justified as obtainable for 
defence. This framing results in any information on the Internet which could potentially “… 
prevent a terrorist attack, [by getting] information ahead of time, […] to carry out that 
critical task.” (ibid.) becomes a matter for the sovereignty of the US. In this optic, all 
information on the Internet is a potential target for US sovereignty claims. As the Internet is 
created without sovereign borders and outside sovereign control this can be considered a 
horizontal move of extra-territorialization. 
Historical claim to the Internet: ICANN 
Another piece of the puzzle is to look at who created the Internet and thus who has the 
historical claim to it. The Internet was originally created by the US as ARPANET in a 
collaboration of scientists’ from the university- and military community. ARPANET was the 
first network-technology based on so-called “packet switching”: the foundation of Internet 
data traffic. The Internet was developed partially, and funded completely, by the Department 
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of Defense. Initially, the technical management of the Internet, the so-called Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), was managed by John Postel, one of the creators of the 
ARPANET, from his university post until 1998 (Leiner et.al. 2012; Masters 2014). Because 
the Internet as ARPANET was initially created by the Department of Defense and their 
private contractors from the university community, the agreement of managing IANA can be 
seen as US governance of the technical management of the Internet as well as their indirect 
ownership of the Internet itself (Kruger 2015:3). In 1998 the Internet Corporation of 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was created in collaboration with the Department of 
Commerce as a private non-profit organisation to oversee the technical management of the 
Internet and long-term also undertake the critical job of IANA. In the creation of ICANN, the 
management of IANA split according to a contract in collaboration between ICANN and US 
Department of Commerce, signalling a US attempt at outsourcing the managing of the 
Internet gradually. ICANN’s purpose is to manage the Global Domain System of the Internet, 
which arranges the link between a domain name and its actual numerical “location” on the 
Internet as well as IP-addresses of the individual device with online access, essentially 
managing all access to the Internet from any device (Masters 2014). While this job is merely 
technical, it is the nearest to an official governance body of the Internet. ICANN is placed in 
California, US, and is guided by an international board of directors, elected internally in the 
ICANN-community and is advised by a committee of representatives from more than 110 
national governments. However, US still has more influence over ICANN than any other 
government due to the US origins of the Internet and its current contract with ICANN on the 
management of IANA. This effectively still gives the US a unique position of power in 
relation to the technical management of the Internet (Kruger 2015:3-4; Masters 2014). 
However, intentions of transition has been put forward by the US’ government: 
 
“Currently, the U.S. government, through the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) at the Department of Commerce, holds a “stewardship” 
role over the domain name system by virtue of a contractual relationship with ICANN. On 
March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and 
procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet 
multistakeholder community. If a satisfactory transition can be achieved, NTIA stated that 
it would let its contract with ICANN expire as early as September 30, 2015. NTIA has also 
stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with 
a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution. “ (Kruger 2015:ii). 
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I argue that firstly, the US has a historical sovereign claim to the Internet given they both 
invented it, administrated it, and in the late 1990s when it had become exceedingly 
commercialised, created a multistakeholder organisation to succeed the technical 
management. Secondarily, the US’ sovereign claim is moving towards less control rather 
than more. The transition towards making the ICANN a truly global multistakeholder 
organisation is in place and the transition of the management is set for fall 2015 (Masters 
2015). The US is thus renouncing its historical claim to the Internet rather than embracing it. 
Current claim to the Internet: Net Neutrality 
The 26th of February 2015 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voted for 
categorising the Internet as a “common carrier” (FCC 2015; Morrison 2015). This ruling was 
a respond to a strategic plan from some ISPs to create so-called “fast lanes” requiring 
companies to pay in order to increase uploading speed for their pages and, as a result, 
decreasing speed on non-paying pages (Edwards 2014). This was legal as long as the Internet 
was classified as “information services” and hence outside the control of the FCC but subject 
to the market. Yet, with categorising the Internet as a “common carrier” or 
“telecommunication services” along the lines of telephones or public transportation, it is 
subject to demands of equal non-discriminative treatment of their services to their 
customers as a type of critical infrastructure (NCTA 2014). Obama came out with a 
statement in November 2014, supporting the idea of the open Internet – or net neutrality, as 
the classification of the Internet as a common carrier provided (White House 2015). This 
shows the political vitality of the subject. However, while the classification have guaranteed 
that ISPs cannot subject Internet access to market pressures, the ruling has also put the 
Internet under government regulation to uphold the responsibilities of being a common 
carrier (McMillan 2014). The classification effectively annexes the Internet as part of the US 
critical infrastructure instead of leaving it to the private market and largely exempting it 
from regulation. 
The case of net neutrality presents two interesting perspectives, the power of being a critical 
infrastructure and the power of not being a critical infrastructure. When the Internet was 
considered “information services”, it was subject to the market, making it possible for the 
individual ISP to provide service and require payment of choice without government 
regulation. This meant that the power to decide on who had Internet access and which 
information should be available was entirely in the hands of the companies, making each 
company its own ruler and regulator. Yet, as the Internet is now considered a “common 
carrier”, it is the government that rules and regulates. Critics argue that making a telecom-
industry into a common carrier creates monopolisation and governmental micromanaging, 
unhealthy for business competition and the consumers (McMillan 2014; NCTA 2014). 
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Is the US extra-territorializing the Internet? 
These two cases are interesting as expressions of US’ political moves for sovereignty online. 
The first case of ICANN shows how the US has exerted less control over the Internet over 
time, handing over the project to the global community. What we are seeing is a 
denationalisation of the Internet by the US minimizing its control over the Internet, not 
increasing it. This picture fits poorly with the notion of US’ increasing sovereignty claims on 
the Internet and their extra-territorializing of same. On the other hand, the case of net 
neutrality reflects a move from considering the Internet outside government control, as a 
private company, into subjecting it to government regulation under FCC rather than the 
Department of Commerce. This fits well with a picture of extra-territorializing a field 
otherwise considered outside government control. 
I argue that what we see compares to Sassen’s notion of sovereigns’ parallel 
denationalization and reterritorialization, or extra-territorialization, to use Adler-Nissen & 
Gammeltoft-Hansen’s term. The US is denationalizing the global technical management of 
the Internet itself while extra-territorializing the regulation of the Internet. All while they are 
utilising practices of data-gathering on the Internet, another sovereign move which is also 
extra-territorializing. The US is decreasing their official governance of the Internet as 
technical managers of the IANA while increasing the regulation of the national Internet 
access and the control of the data online. These politics fit with the idea of using horizontal 
moves to escape conventions because when the US was considered the global technical 
managers of the Internet, they could also be considered subject to global scrutiny as 
responsible for the Internet on a global scale. However, if they only regulate Internet access 
in their national geography they are escaping the international demands immanent in 
controlling a global infrastructure. They are now only responsible for their own population’s 
access and upholding of their rights as protected by themselves as a sovereign rather than 
the rights of the world’s population. They are denationalizing the responsibility for the 
technical function of the Internet but nationalizing the ability to regulate their own citizens 
access to the Internet, all while they claim their data gathering practices to be a question of 
national security. There is no doubt that they are giving up the Internet but how to interpret 
the two consecutive moves? I will argue that what we are seeing is the US’ attempt to 
strengthen its sovereignty by focusing on the parts of the Internet closest to home i.e. 
national regulation and data gathering as protection of the US. But also an attempt at 
dissolving their direct responsibility for the Internet in exchange for indirect impact. In this 
sense they are extra-territorializing in claiming that what happens on the Internet is a matter 
for them as a sovereign; however, they are also building a wall where their main concern is 
protection of their own territory. 
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Chapter III: Discussion, Conclusion and final remarks 
This is the final chapter of my thesis and where I will confirm or deny my hypothesis, Data 
gathering is how sovereignty is wielded on the Internet. This chapter holds the discussion, 
where I critically assert my hypothesis, the thesis’ conclusion and lastly some post-
conclusively remarks on methodology and further research. 
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Discussion: Is data gathering wielding sovereignty on the 
Internet? 
The hypothesis in which I took the point of departure of this thesis was that Data gathering 
is how sovereignty is wielded on the Internet. Yet, after having analysed the US’ data 
gathering practices, legislation and sovereignty claims on the field, I find that reviewing my 
initial assumption is appropriate. The US constitute the most likely case to confirm data 
gathering as measure of sovereignty on the Internet and if these cannot be confirmed 
through my analysis, it is highly unlikely that my hypothesis will apply on any state as case. 
Comparing the tendencies 
When we look at the mere practices of US data gathering as conducted by the NSA as well as 
the FISA legislation legitimising such actions, we see an attempt at extra-territorializing the 
Internet through data gathering and monitoring flows, claiming that all data traffic is of 
potential interest to the US. Moreover, we see that the concrete data gathering and 
monitoring practices are transgressive in the sense that they are not merely concerned with 
targeting suspected terrorists but targets broader making a rather large part of the world’s 
population potential targets of data gathering, justified as prevention of a terrorist attack. 
Unless we endorse the notion that all Internet users with data traffic crossing the US state 
borders such as users of any US-based online corporations are potential terrorists, I find it 
hard to accept that data gathering is only conducted to prevent attacks against the US. Data 
gathering is either criminalizing an almost unlimited part of the global population - both US 
citizens, non-US citizens and particularly non-US citizens with connection to US citizens. If 
not we have to acknowledge that data gathering is conducted with another purpose than 
strictly terrorism prevention and that this purpose might be to expand US sovereign claim 
beyond US sovereign territory. 
The US citizens is the most protected population against US data gathering practices. This is 
striking because in traditional sovereignty the sovereign state “…exercises supreme authority 
over the affairs and people within its territory” (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:307). Thus, it 
should be the US-citizens that were subject to most intense data gathering practices, not 
least. I argue that if we consider data gathering practices as wielding sovereignty, it is strictly 
wielding it as an extra-territorializing measure; a feature of this particular aspect of 
sovereignty wielding is that it protects the population of its jurisdiction more than the 
population outside its jurisdiction. However, in other cases where a national constitution has 
fewer limits or is more vaguely phrased in terms of protecting the individual against state 
intrusion than the US constitution, it could be the national population that where the victims 
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of most intense data gathering. Therefore, when looking at data gathering comparatively the 
constitution of the state conducting the data gathering is paramount. 
Moving above the mere practices of data gathering, the power shifts of the US’ management 
of the Internet reveals a different side of US sovereignty of the Internet. The US president 
has a vital position in the infrastructure of the Internet as the owner of a kill switch. 
Moreover, as the creator of the Internet the US still hold part of the managing power over its 
infrastructure. However, they are currently giving up this power and instead creating a 
national protective sphere around the Internet through dubbing it a “common carrier”. This 
move shifts the Internet from being subject to the Department of Commerce into being 
subject to the Federal Communications Commission, consequently legalizing such kill switch 
under the Communications Act of 1934. What we see is the Internet being re-categorised as 
national infrastructure in what I argue is a nationalising effort. We are seeing an attempt at 
making the Internet sovereign, subjecting it to the US’ supreme authority. Through this 
optic, data gathering practices are not the primary measure for wielding sovereignty. 
Instead, US wields sovereignty through measures of grabbing regulatory and national power 
while shifting managing and global power. The US is shifting the responsibility to uphold the 
Internet to the global community in exchange for a regulatory post because there are 
advantages in ceasing to be responsible for the technical management or IANA. As 
responsible for the IANA they are a type of hegemon holding supreme authority and 
responsibility for global access to the Internet. Therefore, the responsibility for handling 
other nations’ requirements for what the Internet should or should not contain and what 
should be censored or blocked according to not just the US but any nation, is part of being 
the technical manager and is disadvantageous. Thus, the role as global technical manager is 
abandoned in exchange for a national regulatory post of less responsibility. 
It is questionable whether the US would be able to wield sovereign measures over the 
Internet if such a large number of global Internet corporations were not based in the US. 
Currently, much of US data gathering is based upon “buying” information from private 
corporations and telecoms and in some cases wielding court orders. This practice is only 
possible as long as the corporations are based or founded within US territory, creating a link 
between the corporation and the government. The success of US corporations contributes to 
gathering almost unlimited data on the global population through e.g. Facebook and Google. 
I argue that without these corporations US’ data gathering capabilities would be much 
weaker. Therefore, some level of sovereignty entailed in the data gathering practices belongs 
to the private corporations rather than the state, which does not “own” the data but utilises 
its supreme geographical and economical position. They do have a sovereign claim to the 
corporations’ data given it is placed within the US territory but if the corporations moved 
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their entire businesses and resources to another state’s territory, the US would lose 
significant amounts of data gathering capabilities. 
Does it differ from espionage or surveillance? 
To highlight whether data gathering constitutes a way of wielding sovereignty online it is 
relevant to compare the practice as examined in this project with the related concepts 
espionage and, as emphasised in my limitations-section, surveillance. In other words to ask 
whether the way data gathering is utilised by the US differs from the practices of espionage 
or surveillance? Espionage has always been part of states’ conduction of foreign politics. 
Especially in time of war or conflict spying on the enemies have been a useful tool. Since 
espionage is always conducted against other sovereigns and – directly or indirectly, violating 
their sovereign territory, it does serve as a measure of extending the scope of sovereignty. 
However, what really makes the current data gathering practices differ from traditional 
espionage is that 1) data gathering is also conducted on allies as well as ordinary citizens, 
which, in military context, are not targets of espionage. 2) The amount of data gathered is 
less focused. While espionage focuses on certain issues of vital importance, data gathering 
are broad nets catching more or less every flow or stream of data. 3) Espionage is secretive in 
nature. While the actual data gathering practices might also be secret, the FISA legislation 
indicates some level of scope and method for the data gathering practices, the same would 
not be the case with sheer espionage.  
Furthermore, how differs data gathering from surveillance? Data gathering is justified as a 
defence against threats and is a form of surveillance. However, the scope of data gathering 
far exceeds the scope of surveillance – surveillance is targeted whereas data gathering is not. 
Moreover, the net of data gathering is coarse and needs to be filtered as well as analysed 
before it can efficiently be used as material for surveillance. Much like espionage, traditional 
surveillance is often more focused, however, modern surveillance attains many of the same 
features as data gathering, being broad and intercepting more or less any communication 
stream out there. However, 1) surveillance is not demarked to only constituting information 
on the Internet, therefore, surveillance is a broader category than data gathering. 2) While 
surveillance is often conducted by the executive powers, data gathering is mostly done at the 
NSA, an agency specifically designed for providing the state with encryption and decryption 
of code and intelligence. In this sense, data gathering-bodies are a subcategory of 
surveillance agencies; this is also emphasised in the limitations-section which identifies 
surveillance as a particular usage of data gathering. However, it is also the primary usage of 
large-scale data gathering. As my analysis shows, any data gathering legislation or measure 
is justified as protecting the US against actual or potential terrorist threats and the concepts 
are thus strongly related. However, the amount of data contained in the practices of data 
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gathering far outreach the amount of data used in surveillance. I argue that although data 
gathering have similarities and relates to other practices of surveillance, it is a specific 
category. However, the similarities to espionage and its close relation to surveillance 
indicates that data gathering is not self-sufficient as practice; it cannot be alone. 
How much is data gathering wielding sovereignty? 
How much can we consider data gathering as wielding sovereignty in the Internet? Mere 
data gathering has very limited powers and needs to be filtered and analysed to become 
usable. Moreover, data gathering needs to be a link in other governmental activities to be 
legitimately applied: you cannot prosecute or utilised surveillance if you do not have an 
executive and juridical power to employ the data gathered. However, large-scale data 
gathering brings almost unlimited information to these powers and is a powerful tool for e.g. 
espionage or surveillance. What we are seeing is that the US parallel with data gathering 
practices is giving up the technical management of the Internet i.e. giving up global scope of 
sovereignty. Instead, the US apply nationalising efforts by increasingly setting up borders 
around the Internet. While setting up borders they are efficiently placing themselves as 
gatekeepers on any gate or control-point of data’s access into the US. Metaphorically, they 
are making themselves border guards, controlling all access into the national sphere. 
Currently they are only monitoring any stream passing the gates and this stream is rather big 
considering they also guard the territory of big Internet-corporations. However, like with 
real border guards, the line between simply monitoring immigrations/data streams and 
controlling immigration/data streams is narrow. Being a gatekeeper is a power-position and 
with the current developments within the US concerning data gathering as well as 
controlling the Internet, I argue that the US constitute gatekeepers. 
I argue that data gathering is not the primary expression for Internet sovereignty. Instead, 
the primary expression is nationalisation and protection of the territorial parts of the 
Internet, using data gathering as an external measure to obtain data/information to protect 
the national territory as well as wielding their power as gatekeepers to monitor or potentially 
control the flows crossing state borders. I argue that data gathering is a method for utilising 
sovereignty online but must be seen in context with other shifts of power on the Internet. It 
is a way of keeping up with data traffic without possessing the supreme authority over the 
Internet. Yet, gathering data as self-sufficient practice is powerless and must be 
supplemented by moves to sustain power over the sphere of the Internet. US’ current moves 
are pointing towards more bordering of the Internet rather than less, creating borders 
around the national Internet through monitoring all data gaining access without broad 
censoring mechanism. 
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Can we confirm that Data gathering is how sovereignty is wielded on the Internet? It is a 
less significant tendency and is not self-sufficient as it is highly dependent on supplemental 
moves of legislation and territoriality to wield sovereignty - to exercise “…supreme authority 
over the affairs and people within its territory;” (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:307). Currently, 
we can confirm that it is a highly usable extra-territorializing measure of utilising 
sovereignty outside the state territory and needs to be seen in context with the US making 
themselves gatekeepers of any data crossing their borders. Yet it must be emphasised that 
data gathering is mostly a measure used outside the state and therefore does not qualify as a 
strictly sovereign measure. Therefore my hypothesis is relevant but not absolute true, 
because it captures one strategy of wielding Internet sovereignty - a strategy which opens up 
for seeing how the US as state is wielding sovereignty overall on the Internet. 
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Conclusion & Summary 
In this thesis, I have tested a hypothesis on Internet Governance asking whether: Data 
gathering is how sovereignty is wielded on the Internet. My answer is that on its own data 
gathering is not wielding sovereignty on the Internet; it is not a self-sufficient practice. 
Instead, it is part of broader tendencies of the US trying to carve their own sovereign piece of 
the Internet and is a useful tool for that purpose. 
Because of the high complexity of the field of Internet Governance as well as the questions of 
the borders of sovereign territory on the Internet, I have used three theories of sovereignty. 
The usage of different theories are essential in grasping the nuances of wielding sovereignty 
on the online space as it differs from traditional wielding of sovereignty as well as ideas of 
territory. The US is both creating a national sovereign Internet while utilising stronger 
measures of data gathering on data placed outside the US than inside, extending the US’ 
scope of sovereignty while demarking their own national sphere; I would not have been able 
to grasp this ambiguity of the US’ sovereign practices utilising fewer theories. In the 
following, I will sum up the conclusions of each subanalysis accordingly. 
I: Can the US current practices concerning data gathering and data regulation be categorised as 
control of flows? 
In my first subanalysis, I look at US practices of data gathering and regulation. NSA employ 
six main tendencies in their data gathering practices: Gathering data concerning non-targets 
and targets which are not criminal and/or terrorists; attaining access to the Internet’s 
backbone through access to fibre optics and telecom corporations’ data; attaining access to 
the servers of private corporations; using malware to unknowingly pull data from users 
computers; collaborating with other countries intelligence agencies; and gathering foreign 
data unauthorized by the foreign state. These tendencies show an intensive culture of data 
gathering at the NSA, prioritising gaining access to the Internet’s physical infrastructure as 
well as using their geographical position to gain access to the servers of US-based 
corporations. We see that the NSA uses measures to filtrate the data gathered, making it 
more accessible and usable. However, the NSA “buys” much of the data they gather and in 
effect only own part of the data. Consequently, much of NSA data gathering capacity relies 
on the domination of US-based corporations on the Internet to gather data for them. This is 
a strategy of monitoring and gathering data crossing the US borders and NSA attaining 
access to control-points of the Internet, which could potentially be wielded as control. 
However, the scope of this strategy is limited by fixating more on non-US citizens than US 
citizens. The US is more inclined to gather and control data beyond their geographical 
territory and jurisdiction than within it.  
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The filtering practices utilised by the US state on the population’s access to data online are 
weak. While the US state has fought in many years to protect minors against content deemed 
harmful through blocking measures and censoring child pornography as well as hindering 
online gambling and copyrights infringement, they have failed and repeatedly the proposed 
measures of blocking are deemed unconstitutional. Instead, US’ regulatory measures on the 
Internet currently rests on content removal, which needs the material to be published before 
it can be removed. This emphasises the weak measures of regulatory content control in the 
US. While the US’ practices of data gathering are strong externally, i.e. on foreigners and 
data crossing state borders, it is internally weak. 
The US is utilising brute force on the Internet itself. A political decision of making the 
Internet a “common carrier” under the Communications Act of 1934 effectively gave the US 
permission to install a kill switch on the Internet. Moreover, Executive Order 13618 from 
2012 gave the President the power to take over the Internet in times of emergency. This gives 
the US sovereignty on the Internet. 
Overall, the NSA uses the technological advancements otherwise considered to weaken the 
sovereign state to strengthen their sovereignty through monitoring and gathering data, both 
alone and in cooperation with other states and agents. To answer my subquestion: Can the 
US current practices concerning data gathering and data regulation be categorised as 
control of flows? I argue that the US is monitoring the flows crossing state borders, tapping 
into control-points without currently engaging in actual control. However, the theories hold 
no answer to whether control is needed to verify sovereignty or the potential for control is 
enough. The notion of control have shown hard to prove empirically on the Internet because 
when do we know that control has been utilised on data? How do we know what control 
entails? In practice, this is a theoretical and methodological open-ended question and 
consequently, it is disputable whether the US can be seen as a sovereign despite their 
wielding of brute force. 
II: Which sovereign constellation of TAR is immanent in the US data gathering legislation? 
When analysing the US data gathering legislation, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), we see a parallel distinction between internal and external territory. The legislation 
differs between targeting people reasonably believed to be inside or outside the US. This is 
evident when people located outside the US are excluded from being subject to “electronic 
surveillance”, which requires warrants for conduction. This distinction reveals that the 
territory of US data gathering legislation excludes, rather than includes, its own population 
from the most intense data gathering measures. Thus, there is a clear territorial demarcation 
of data gathering as practice of sovereignty partially excluding own jurisdictional territory. 
This shows that the sovereign demands sovereignty on the global territory of data but is 
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bound by the restrictions of national legislation on sovereign territory, restrictions which are 
absent on the global level. 
This demarcation of the US refers to the US constitution or Bill of Rights, particularly First 
and Fourth Amendment. First Amendment states that the freedom of speech should be free 
from government intrusion, consequently hindering any potential censoring measures on the 
Internet. Fourth Amendment hinders unreasonable and unlawful searches, demanding 
warrants or probable cause in any such case. The law demarks the US citizens as targets of 
data gathering as this would constitute warrantless searches, yet the legislation also subjects 
foreign citizens to the Fourth Amendment while denying them this very protection against 
unreasonable searches; this indicates a legislative ambiguity. Yet, a loophole exist where 
metadata is not considered a search and is thus legitimate to gather and monitor. The main 
target of this data gathering is the data crossing the US state borders, vindicated in the 
threat of terrorism coming from outside the US. This is what ultimately results in the 
unequal rights between US-citizens and non-US citizens. 
The official authority of the FISA-legislation is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC). However, due to the 98% success-rate for acquiring warrants and general critique of 
the court, it seems to be a carte blanche for the Justice Department and the Intelligence 
agencies applying for these warrants. Moreover, all judges of FISC and the FISC reviewing 
body responsible for overseeing FISC’s decisions are all appointed by the Chief Justice of US 
Supreme Court. This indicates a system of no real checks and balances, but instead a FISC 
ultimately managed by the Department of Justice as the underlying Authority. In this sense, 
the sovereign constellation of the FISA regime is bundled close to the US state 
The answer to which sovereign constellation of TAR is immanent in the US data gathering 
legislation constitutes a reign of data gathering under FISA-legislation. This reign primarily 
targets people outside the US, is restrained by the Bill of Rights and run by the Department 
of Justice. This capability is unified by the organisational logic of protecting the US against 
actual or potential threats from foreign powers or terrorism. The logic complies that 
gathering enough data will potentially prevent an attack and that securitization is 
paramount. Because securitization is key, it comes second whether the authority of this reign 
can be transparent, just and reliable. It is unified by the idea of security first as paramount in 
the sovereign constellation. 
III: Does the US political reaction to Snowden’s leaks align with a contested sovereign 
defending itself? How are the US currently claiming sovereignty on the Internet? 
I ask whether the US reactions to Snowden’s leaks align with the idea of a contested 
sovereign defending itself. In the Press Conference by president Obama in light of Snowden’s 
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leaks, we see a president focused on three ulterior framings: first and foremost stating that 
data gathering practices as conducted by the US is a matter of putting security first and is of 
vital importance for protecting the US against the threat of terrorism. Second, downplaying 
the role of Snowden, avoiding mentioning his name and generally emphasising the leaks as 
un-patriotic and criminal. Thirdly, the president emphasises that transparency in the 
Intelligence’s data gathering and monitoring is needed, and that he requires reviews of the 
legislation, meeting the critiques of the sceptics towards the data gathering and surveillance 
programs. While the president complies with the sceptics, he denies the critique of the data 
gathering programs. Since it would have been the easiest to comply with the criticism saying 
that yes, we should regulate our legislation, making sure that no ordinary US citizen is 
target of illicit surveillance, he does not. This indicates that the broad data gathering 
practice of US Intelligence are concerning sovereignty and must be defended at all cost. 
Therefore, the US political reaction aligns with a contested sovereign defending itself and 
data gathering-practices are thus a measure to contain sovereignty. 
In terms of US claiming sovereignty on the Internet, we see three parallel moves of shifting 
sovereign power over the Internet. From the Press conference, we see an attempt at 
securitizing global data traffic, making it subject to extra-territorial rule i.e. rule beyond own 
sovereign territory. Second, we see the US is giving up their technical management of the 
Internet, IANA, to a body of multistakeholderism, ICANN, despite their historical sovereign 
claim to the Internet as its creator. Thus, they are decreasing rather than increasing their 
sovereignty over the Internet in an act of denationalisation. However, the US have dubbed 
the Internet a “common carrier” subjecting it to government regulation and conclusively 
making the Internet a critical infrastructure of the US. Thus, the US domestic regulatory 
power of the Internet shifts from being the technical management of the entire Internet and 
subject of the Department of Commerce to regulating the national sphere of the Internet and 
subject to the Federal Communications Commission. This move is also extra-territorializing 
in that it subjects the Internet to the demands of the state as well as nationalising it by 
reinforcing a national sovereign sphere on the US “part” of the Internet. 
So how are the US currently claiming sovereignty on the Internet? What we are seeing is 
the US’ attempt to strengthen its sovereignty claim nationally by focusing on the parts of the 
Internet closest to home i.e. national regulation and data gathering. Followed by an attempt 
at dissolving their direct responsibility and thus sovereignty claim for the whole of the 
Internet in exchange for indirect impact. They are extra-territorializing in claiming what 
happens on the Internet is a matter for them as a sovereign; however, they are also building 
borders to protect their own Internet “territory”. 
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Conclusion – hypothesis denied? 
Does this mean that my hypothesis is denied - is data gathering not how sovereignty is 
wielded on the Internet? Not necessarily. 
The practices of data gathering stand as one of the more important ways of wielding 
sovereignty on the Internet. While the US is setting up borders, they are efficiently placing 
themselves as gatekeepers of any control-point or point of entry for data in the US. They are 
currently only monitoring the vast streams of data, however, if data filters are developed with 
fine enough masks and if circumstances require it, the distance between monitoring a gate 
and controlling the streams passing through a gate is small. 
Overall, data gathering is not the primary expression of Internet sovereignty. Instead, it is 
nationalisation and protection of the national sphere of the Internet, using data gathering as 
an external measure to obtain data to protect the national territory – this is evident in US 
giving up the global sovereignty of the Internet in exchange for national sovereignty. Data 
gathering is a method for wielding Internet sovereignty but is not self-sufficient. Data 
gathering in itself is aimless yet if combined with other moves of sovereignty can be highly 
powerful. The current practice of data gathering supplemented by moves of nationalisation 
and extra-territorialization introduces a new type of borders around the Internet through 
measures of monitoring all content gaining access to the US. In this sense, the US is certainly 
carving a sovereign piece of the Internet by utilising means of bordering; however, bordering 
in a new way compared to traditional sovereignty. 
Thus, my hypothesis is relevant but not confirmed. Data gathering is not self-sufficiently 
wielding sovereignty on the Internet. Instead, it is a measure employed by the state outside 
the state, which in cooperation with others moves for sovereignty is influential and can aid in 
wielding sovereignty if supplemented by legislation and territoriality as well as political 
moves. Data gathering is an extra-territorializing measure of utilising sovereignty outside 
the nation-state territory as well as a measure to create gatekeeping power. It is part of the 
battle for sovereignty on the Internet but currently not attaining sovereignty on its own. 
How does this conclusion contribute to the current literature of Internet Governance and 
debates on how sovereignty is doing facing structures of globalised nature? Firstly, it reveals 
that sovereignty is important and that practices of implementing new types of borders is 
one strategy of sovereignty, giving up a global sovereign position in exchange for national 
sovereignty is another. Second, that gatekeeping-power is an important aspect to consider 
as a way to influence non-geographical streams. Thirdly, that the geographical position of 
corporations is essential for wielding sovereignty. Lastly, that the sovereign can demand 
sovereignty on the global territory but remain bound by national legislation on its own 
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territory. These are aspects that have been evident from the case of the Internet and might be 
relevant considering both broader research on Internet Sovereignty as well as general cases 
where the state’s sovereignty is seen to be put under pressure by globalising structures. 
  
73 
 
Comments on findings 
I find that reviewing the conclusion’s methodological validity and choices is relevant for 
understanding the basis of this conclusion. 
My theoretical foundation has been sovereignty, while sovereignty is a contested concept I 
have chosen not to pick one single theory. This, however, have consequences for my 
conclusion’s argumentation and while I find that using different concepts increases the 
scope, using a single theory of sovereignty would have increased the clarity of the 
argumentation. Moreover, it would have created a clearer answer to whether my hypothesis 
is confirmable. Choosing one rather than three theories would also have resulted in a more in 
depth analysis. While my hypothesis refers to sovereignty in general, I limit myself to only 
discussing the case of the US. Therefore, I cannot verify whether data gathering generally 
wields sovereignty. However, since the US currently seems to be the country with the 
broadest and most aggressive form of data gathering as well as constitution the current 
geographical core of the Internet infrastructure, it would most likely be here we could find 
proof of my hypothesis. Lastly, the classified nature of the field that I examined has evident 
consequences for the validity of my conclusion. I have been careful in making sure that I had 
empirical backing in all of my discussions, however, this have hindered the strength of my 
conclusions. 
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Further Perspectives 
I argue that my thesis conclusions as well as its way of conducting research on the power 
structures and shaping of the Internet itself, presents new insights to the scientific field of 
Internet Governance. Moreover, I see it as opening an entire field and approach to 
understanding how sovereignty is or can unfold on the Internet as well as understanding the 
Internet geographically. 
My thesis identifies a number of related fields that would be interesting to examine. Firstly, 
my theories claims that other holders of sovereignty than the state exist and my analysis 
indicates that the NSA is dependent on private corporations for data gathering. Therefore, it 
would be relevant to analyse other holders of sovereignty such as private Internet 
corporations and online communities, telecoms, hacktivists etc. 
A comparative perspective, comparing US tendencies which countries or regions such as 
China, EU, Russia or small states would be highly relevant. If I should point at one focus for 
further research, this would be it. EU enacted a data retention incentive in 2007 (Roberts & 
Palfrey 2010) containing high relevance for my hypothesis. Moreover, comparing US’ 
attempts at bordering the Internet with the Chinese Firewall of the Internet would also bring 
insights into the current tendencies of State Sovereignty on Internet Governance. 
Lastly, the United States Court of Appeals ruled metadata gathering illegal under the Patriot 
Act in May (Greenberg 2015), which has resulted in the passing of the USA Freedom Act on 
June 2nd (Froomkin 2015). While the consequences of this legislation is not yet clear, 
following the future developments in US data gathering and surveillance legislation will be of 
high relevance. Moreover, keeping track on whether more checks and balances on the 
administrative system of data gathering will emerge and whether the organisational culture 
of (hyper)-surveillance will change are further points which will indicate how the future of 
the US sovereignty on the Internet will turn out.  
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